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ABSTRACT 
FOURTY FIVE YEARS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS SYRIA: 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
AYDOĞDU, ÖZAY MURAT 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
July 2005 
 
This thesis analyzes the Turkish-Syrian relations between 1945 and 1990 and 
examines whether there was an influence of the Soviet Union or not in relations 
between both states. Although Turkish foreign policy was accepted as pro-western 
oriented policy by academic environment, it can be said that Turkey was partly 
influenced by the Soviet Union in its policy towards Syria.  
Turkey established relations with Syria and Middle Eastern states in varying 
approaches, and adopted these approaches in order to be in harmony with the West. 
However, the Soviet Union was important in Turkish foreign policy towards Syria 
because Syria was a Soviet advocate in the Middle East and was supported widely by 
the Soviet Union. Although the opinion of the Turkish foreign policy was stemmed 
from the Soviet Union was widespread, Turkey used the Soviet menace for its 
domestic and international interests. On the contrary, especially in post-1960 
policies, Turkey improved its relations with the Soviet Union while it established 
rapprochement with Arab states in order to keep its national interests.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey, Syria, the Soviet Union, The Middle 
East 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA SURİYE’NİN KIRKBEŞ YILI: 
SOVYET SOSYALİST CUMHURİYETLER BİRLİĞİ’NİN GÖLGESİNDE 
 
AYDOĞDU, ÖZAY MURAT 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Temmuz 2004 
 
Bu tezde Türkiye-Suriye ilişkilerinin 1945 ila 1990 yılları arası incelenecek 
ve iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilere Sovyetler Birliği’nin etkisi olup olmadığı 
sorgulanacaktır. Her ne kadar akademik çevrelerde Türkiye’nin dış politikasında batı 
yanlısı bir tutum izlediği genel kabul görmüşse de Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye karşı 
izlediği politikalarda Sovyetler Birliği’nden kısmen etkilendiği de söylenebilir.  
Türkiye değişen yönelimlerle Suriye ve Ortadoğu devletleri ile ilişkiler 
kurmuş, bu değişen yönelimlerin çoğunluğunu batı ile uyum içinde olmak için tatbik 
etmiştir. Ama Suriye’nin Ortadoğu’da Sovyet taraftarı bir devlet olması ve Sovyetler 
Birliği’nden geniş destek bulmasından dolayı, Türkiye Suriye’ye karşı izlediği dış 
politikalarda Sovyetler Birliği her zaman önemli bir yer tutmuştur. Türk dış 
politikaların Sovyet tehdidinden kaynaklandığı fikri yaygın olsa da gerçekte Türkiye 
Sovyet tehdidini kendisi iç ve dış politika amaçları için kullanmıştır. Aksine, 
özellikle 1960 sonrası politikalarda, Türkiye kendi ulusal çıkarları korumak için Arap 
ülkeleri yakınlaşma tesis ederken, Sovyetler Birliği ile olan ilişkilerini de 
geliştirmiştir.  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye, Suriye, Sovyetler Birliği, Ortadoğu 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey’s relations with Arab world were rarely discussed and took limited 
place in Turkish foreign relations. This might be because of historical reasons and 
Turkey’s way to contemporary world that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk drew. Indeed, 
from the establishing of the newly founded Turkish Republic, Turkey had little 
interests towards the Middle East. The Hatay issue was an exception in Turkish 
foreign policy. However, with the end of World War II and changing balances in the 
Middle East, Turkey had to apply a different way in its foreign policy. Because of 
growing Soviet influence in all over the world, as well as in the Middle East, 
Turkey’s foreign policy integrated and cooperated with the West against the Soviet 
threat and in Middle Eastern affairs.  
Syria had played a crucial role from the end of World War II in Middle 
Eastern affairs with Egypt. Indeed the phrase “Peace did not become fact without 
Egypt in the Middle East; War did not become fact without Syria either” realized 
through the years. Actually Syria, which had disputes with its neighbors from its 
gaining independence, was almost in every war and conflict in the Middle East. This 
was because of policies and desires, maybe sometimes wrong calculations, of Syrian 
politicians and statesmen.  
Turkish foreign policy towards Syria was not different from policy towards 
Arab world. Although Turkey had a declivitous policy towards Syria, it was the same 
policy that Turkey followed towards Arab world. While Turkey had established good 
relationship with Syria in some tenure, its relations worsened in other periods. The 
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relationship between Syria and Turkey worsened in the 1950s that might be led to a 
war. At the same time the relations came to a friendlier atmosphere during the 1970s. 
Although the relationship can be influenced by historical reasons, either side 
influenced from international powers and their interests. While Turkey was aligned 
with the West because of its policy of establishing good relations with the West and 
securing itself from Soviet threat, Syria took side next to the Soviet Union because of 
seeing the West as imperialist states and supporter of Israel.  
This thesis will inquire how Union of Soviet Socialist Republics affected the 
relationship between Syria and Turkey and Turkish foreign policy towards Syria? At 
the same time, this study examines how the Soviets influenced the Middle East 
relations in general and Syrian relations in private, while Turkey followed a western-
oriented policy in its relations?  
It has been long argued that Syria, which seemed to be a Soviet ‘client’ in the 
Middle East throughout the post-World War II, followed a policy of supporting 
Soviet interests in the Middle East. Syria took helps and aid from the Soviet Union in 
its way of supporting Soviet interests. However, with the help of Soviet supports, 
Syria was a danger to the Middle East peace and created an unstable situation in the 
Middle East. Sometimes Syrian active policy, which mostly adopted by Hafez Assad, 
even caused Syria isolated from Arab world.  
On the other side, Turkey had a western-oriented foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. Although the policy fluctuated throughout the post-World War II years, 
it had little change and deviation from its main origin. The pro-active policy that 
Turkey followed the 1950s caused isolation from Arab world, in which Turkey saw 
harms in its national interests in the following years. The isolation and lack of Arab 
support in international arena led Turkey search for a new orientation in its foreign 
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policy. The orientation included rapprochement with Arab world and improving 
relations with the Soviet Union.  
Another objective of the study was that if Turkey realized its foreign policy 
towards Syria because of Soviet menace or not. While I explained whether a Soviet 
menace was in real or not, I will also examine Syrian support to terrorist 
organizations towards Turkey and Syrian stance in water disputes. 
This thesis comprises in two part and six chapters. In the first part, I tried to 
explain the relations between Syria and the Soviet Union from the end of World War 
II to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In order to explain the relationship, I use 
cases studies between Syria and the Soviet Union, and also Soviet attitude in Syrian 
bilateral conflicts and disputes with its neighbors. Chapter I includes the 1945-1964 
period and some case studies that were milestones in the relations. I tried to put in 
this chapter Soviet hesitation in getting into Middle Eastern affairs and Nikita 
Khrushchev’s intentions of being an authority in the Middle East by using 
diplomacy. Chapter II includes cases studies and relations between 1964 and 1982. 
This chapter will examine the Soviet foreign policy under Leonid Brezhnev and two 
main approaches that Brezhnev used. Chapter III includes cases of the 1982-1990 
tenure in relations. The last three presidents and their attitude, which was taken into 
account as more defensive than their predecessor, towards the Middle East and Syria 
will be studied in this chapter.  
In the second part of the thesis, I tried to explain the relations between Syria 
and Turkey. As in the first part, I also use case studies in order to explain relations 
between Syria and Turkey. Like the first part, the second part divided into three 
chapters. Chapter IV explains relations between 1945 and 1960. Turkey’s 
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and its reflections are put forward in this 
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chapter that Adnan Menderes played a crucial role during the era. Chapter V looked 
to the relations of the 1960-1980 tenure. The changing policy of Turkey towards the 
Middle East because of international and domestic reasons includes rapprochement 
with the Arab world and establishing good relations with the Soviet Union are the 
main aims of this chapter. Chapter VI argues relations from the 1980 coup d’état to 
1990. Following the coup d’état and becoming Turgut Özal as Prime Minister, 
Turkey followed a more activist policy in the Middle East than the last two decade, 
while pointed out Syrian support for terrorism and its stance in water disputes. This 
chapter will argue on these subjects. 
Consequently, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and Syria was 
far from Soviet fear. However the foreign policy was adopted in the line of Turkey’s 
national and international interests. Indeed Turkey had to take its side with the Soviet 
Union and Arabs as well as Syria because of taking no support from its western allies 
in some international crisis that Turkey faced. Nonetheless Turkey did not change 
completely its main attitude in foreign relations towards the contemporary world.  
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PART A:  
RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND SYRIA 
 
CHAPTER I: 
‘ACTIVE DIPLOMACY’ IN RELATIONS 
 
1.1. A Short History of Syria 
In 1914, after nearly 400 years under a province of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Middle East was at the height of change, conflict, and war. The Middle East is a 
strategic region that the Great Powers had interests. With the beginning of World 
War I, having strong and ambitious interests towards oil-rich region, the Great 
Powers did not bring cohesion to the region but divisiveness.  
Following rebellions against it and defeat in its Arab provinces, the army of 
the Ottoman Empire in Damascus vacated the city. Faysal, the son of Serif Hussein, 
who commanded the Arab forces, entered Damascus in October 1918. Having 
controlled nearly whole of Syria except the coastal strip where French forces were 
present, the period of de facto independence was beginning.1 However France, 
according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was signed by Britain and France in 
May 1916, captured Damascus on July 24, 1920, and took over the government. The 
League of Nations accepted the governance of Syria under French Mandate on July 
24, 1922. Although Syria had a mandate government, rebellious movements had just 
                                                 
1 Zeine N. Zeine. 1977. The Struggle for Arab Independence, Western Diplomacy and the Rise and 
Fall of Faisal’s Kingdom in Syria. New York: Caravan Books, pp.10-11 cited in Mehmet Akif Okur. 
2004. “Fransız Manda Yönetimi Döneminde Suriye.”(Syria under the French Mandate Administration 
Era.) In Türel Yılmaz and Mehmet Şahin (eds.) 2004. Ortadoğu Siyasetinde Suriye (Syria in the 
Middle East Politics). Ankara: Platin. pp.5-6. 
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begun after the mandate decree until 1927. However, from 1927 to 1939, politics 
gained importance in Syria. Several political formations worked for Syria’s 
independence.  
With the beginning of World War II, Syria was again on the war scene. 
France was under the occupation of Germany, thus this situation had weakened and 
lessened French predominance in the French mandate states as in Syria. The National 
Block came to power after the 1943 elections, and Shukri al-Quwatli was elected as 
president of Syria. By using the weak position of France, many main administrative 
offices were taken away from French control. After these developments, Syria was 
recognized as a sovereign state, despite French opposition, by the USSR in July 
1944, by the USA in September and one year after them, Britain. After several 
confrontations between Syrian and French forces, a UN resolution in February 1946 
was accepted on calling France to evacuate. The French government agreed on the 
resolution and all French troops left Syrian soil by April 15, 1946. On April 17, Syria 
gained independence and celebrated this event as the Evacuation Day, which is 
officially accepted as a national holiday.2 
Independence did not bring stability to Syria; Syria’s politics witnessed much 
violent behavior and sudden changes. Being unhappy about government policy and 
administration, some people who were effective on the political scene, especially the 
army officers started the period of coup d’etats. Respectively, the coup of General 
Husni Zaim in March 1949, Colonel Sami el-Hinnawi in September 1949, Colonel 
Adip el-Shishakli in December 1949, and Colonel Faysal el-Atasi in February 1954.3 
The unstable situation of Syria continued with five different regimes during the 
                                                 
2 Information was available in the internet on http://countrystudies.us/syria. Accessed on February 27, 
2005. 
3 Selahattin İbas. 2004. Türkiye-Suriye İlişkilerinin Tarihi (The History of the Turkish-Syrian 
Relations). In Türel Yılmaz and Mehmet Şahin (eds.) op.cit. p.48. For more information George 
Lenczowski. 1953. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 231-258. 
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period, 1955-1970: Shukri al-Quwatli (August 1955-February 1958), Gamal abd al-
Nasser - united under the United Arab Republic (February 1958-September 1961), 
unstable military rule (September 1961-March 1963), Right-wing Ba’ath regime of 
Colonel Lu’ay al-Atasi and General Amin al-Hafiz (March 1963-February 1966), the 
Left-Wing Ba’ath regime of President Nur al-Din al-Atasi and General Salah Jadid 
(February 1966-November 1970).4 In the coup of Salah Jadid, Hafiz Assad played an 
important role in the success of the coup and Jadid recognized Assad as his potential 
rival from then on. This struggle for power between Assad and Jadid ended in 
November 1970 and resulted in Assad’s victory. General Hafiz al-Assad seemed to 
bring Syria more stability when compared to his predecessors.5  
 
1.2. USSR’s Policy towards Syria under Joseph Stalin 
The Middle Eastern states were subjected to the imperialist forces, especially 
Great Britain and France for nearly fifty years, Syria included. It will not be wrong to 
say almost all of the nations in the Middle East had bitter relations with both 
imperialist states. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had little interest towards the 
Middle East, because the USSR had more concern over other states, especially the 
East European states. Thus the Soviet Union had a very good chance in having 
influence over the Middle East, since the Middle Eastern states had no experience of 
Russian imperialism and had no common borders with it.  
After World War II, Joseph Stalin shaped the foreign policy of USSR. In 
Stalin’s view, the world was divided into two main camps: communist and anti-
communist. Stalin thought the others, the Third World, neutral states. Stalin tried to 
                                                 
4 Information was available in the internet on http://countrystudies.us/syria. Accessed on in February 
27, 2005. 
5 R.D.Mclaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W.Snider. 1982. Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and 
Processes. New York: Praeger Publishers. pp.242-243. 
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spread communism to East European states than elsewhere. In other words, Stalin’s 
interest in the Middle East was especially towards the USSR’s periphery - Turkey 
and Iran – and he tried to influence these states by considering the other states in the 
Middle East,6 despite having a great chance of affecting the Middle Eastern states. 
According to Stalin’s way of thinking, the Soviet press called the Third 
World state leaders, such as Nasser, Shishakli, and Nehru, “lackeys of the 
imperialists.” Since Pedro Ramet summarized the traditional aims of great powers in 
the Middle East as “to exclude its rivals from the area, to promote its foreign policy 
interests broadly, and to assure itself of the resources and strategic position essential 
to its security,”7 Stalin applied a foreign policy in the Middle East to decrease the 
influence of main imperialist states, especially Britain’s, and to exclude its rivals 
from the region,8 rather than to have influence on the Middle Eastern states. Indeed 
Stalin avoided direct interference into the area, for example he rejected the request of 
King Farouk on ousting Britain from Egypt, because, according to Nikita 
Khrushchev, Stalin thought that the Middle East or Near East was Britain’s ‘sphere 
of influence’ and the USSR “couldn’t go sticking our nose into Egypt’s affairs.”9 The 
strategy in recognition of Israel in 1948 and military and diplomatic support to Israel 
during the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to 1949 was mainly Stalin’s hope that 
Israel would become a socialist state and caused Britain lose its military positions in 
the Middle East by waning Britain’s positions.10 
                                                 
6 Mark A. Heler. 1992. The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East. Jerusalem: Tel Aviv 
University. p.22. 
7 Pedro Ramet. 1990. The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance. Boulder: 
Westview Press. p.3. 
8 Galia Golan. 1990. Soviet Policies in the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, p.10. 
9 Strobe Talbott. (ed. and trans.) 1970. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown. p.431 cited in 
Mark A. Heler. op. cit. p.23. 
10 Talal Nizameddin. 1998. Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy. London: 
Hurst & Company. p.18. 
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In sum, it can be said that the position of the USSR in the Middle East and of 
course in Syria was one of low profile in Stalin’s era because of Stalin’s giving less 
priority to relations with the Middle Eastern states.  
 
1.3. USSR- Syria under Nikita Khrushchev: ‘Active Diplomacy’ 
With the death of Stalin, Khrushchev became the President of the USSR. 
Khrushchev made fundamental changes in foreign relations towards the Middle East 
and also Syria. Khrushchev’s worldviews was different from Stalin’s. He thought 
that the world was divided into three main camps: “the socialist bloc, the capitalist 
bloc, and the Third World.” He wanted to make the other countries communist so as 
to speak the same language. In order to make them, especially the Third World, 
communist, the main tactics that Khrushchev used were economic and military aid 
and political support.11 
Khrushchev tried to extend Soviet supremacy by using communism 
everywhere in the world at a rapid pace. However, since Khrushchev saw himself the 
leader of the international communist movement, he had difficulties and obstacles in 
his policies towards the Middle East and in Syria on its own communist parties. 
Because some states, e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, saw their own communists as 
a threat to their regime. 
Nonetheless, with the overthrow of the Shishakli dictatorship in Syria in early 
1954, the new Syrian government, which were notably the Ba’ath party, seemed to 
be very pro-Russian and Leftists. Thus the new government made alliance and 
cooperation with the USSR possible. To show their good intentions towards the 
USSR, one of their initial policies was the recall of the communist leader Khalid 
                                                 
11 Galia Golan. op. cit. p.9. 
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Bakdash from exile, who was elected to Parliament and became an important figure 
for the next few years.12  
While good intentions were shown to the USSR, Khrushchev, despite 
opposition from Molotov and Kaganovich, decided to enter the Middle East 
intensively. In early 1955, the first arms shipment of MIG-15 was sent to Syria by 
Czechoslovakia with technicians and training personnel,13 at a total cost of £100 
million.14 In March 1955, Molotov reacted to Turkish and Iraqi concentration near 
the Syrian border in order to force Syria to join the Baghdad Pact and stated that the 
USSR was ready to “aid in any form whatsoever for the purpose of safeguarding 
Syria’s independence and sovereignty.”15 The USSR, in order to show its support to 
Syria, signed a Trade and Payments Agreement in November 1955, and also in late 
1955 the legations were mutually upgraded to full-fledged embassies.16 The 
improving relations gave its fruits first with similar reaction that was given to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine by Syria and the USSR, both claiming that the doctrine was an 
intervention to the internal affairs of Middle Eastern states.17 
In 1957 came, Syria was the ripest state in the Middle East to become 
communist. Thus Syria gained the special interest of Moscow between 1954 and 
1957. As some examples of developing relations were given above, 1956 was the 
year of improved relations: in February Syria received Soviet arms, in August Syria 
                                                 
12 Charles B. Mclane. 1973. Soviet-Middle East Relations. London: Central Asian Research Centre. 
p.90. 
13 Peter Mangold. 1977. “The Soviet-Syrian Military Relationship, 1955-77.” Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies.  p.28 cited in Pedro Ramet. op. cit. p.16. 
14 Talal Nizameddin. op. cit. p.23. 
15 Peter Mangold. 1977. “The Soviet-Syrian Military Relationship, 1955-77.” Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies.  p.26 cited in Pedro Ramet. op. cit. p.15. 
16 Pedro Ramet. op. cit. pp.16-17. 
17 Fahir Armaoğlu. 1989. Filistin Meselesi ve Arab-İsrail Savaşları (1948–1988) (The Palestinian 
Question and The Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1988)). Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları. 
p.203. 
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and the USSR signed an agreement on cultural, scientific, and athletic cooperation,18 
and President Quwatli visited the USSR in October 1956. In 1957, the Soviet Union 
sent a huge amount of military and economic aid to Syria where some writers gave 
the amount of $98 million19 and the others gave the number $579 million, in return 
for economic and technical agreement.20  
The period 1961-1966 comprised Syrian political instability. There were 
eight coups before the leftist Ba’ath party, which was led by Nur al-din al-Atasi and 
General Salah Jadid, came to power. The USSR treated these coups differently, 
based on their being progressive or conservative. However the USSR recognized all 
the regimes officially and tried to continue good relationship between states. 
However, the Soviets treated the coups, especially Rightist Ba’ath as negative, even 
some radio programs, writers and newspapers criticized the Rightist Ba’ath regime 
and its policies.21  
 
1.3.1. The 1957 Crisis 
The crisis began between Syria and Turkey in 1955 when Turkish and Iraqi 
troops concentrated on the Syrian border, and the USSR declared to aid Syria to 
guard its independence and sovereignty.22 Indeed the reason for this crisis was to 
force Syria to join the Baghdad Pact, which was formed by ‘Northern Tier’ states - 
Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, - and Britain. The USA joined the pact later as an 
                                                 
18 Pedro Ramet. op. cit. p.20. 
19 A. Grigoryev. 1968. Soviet Union – Friend of the Arab Peoples. Moscow. p.45, cited in Charles B. 
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observer. The purpose of the pact was to form a strategic alliance against foreign 
powers, i.e. the USSR. Because the USSR had been pressuring these states on several 
occasions, e.g. territorial demand from Turkey and joint defense rights on the Straits. 
Sharing similar worries like Turkey, all the members of pact members in the Middle 
East like Iraq were “anxious to retain a strategic link with the western powers; it as 
more aware of the proximity of Russia than were other Arab countries.”23 
Syria, which was not aware of Russian danger like the other Baghdad Pact 
members, had been developing its relations with the USSR. In return, its relations 
were strained with neighbors – Turkey and Iraq. Since Turkey and Iraq were 
members of the Baghdad Pact, they felt uncomfortable about the development of 
relations between Syria and the USSR like a credit agreement on economic and 
technical fields, which was signed between Syria and the USSR, which was a clear 
attempt of the Soviets growing support to Syria.24 While the tight relations between 
Syria and the USSR were developing, the USA “feared that Syria was becoming a 
Soviet satellite, and nervously contacted its allies in the region.”25  
As a result, Turkey, which increased its forces from 32.000 to 50.000 and put 
together contingency plans for intervening in Syria with Iraq,26 made some military 
maneuvers and concentrations on the border; however this gave to the Soviets a 
chance publicly to support Syria by putting pressure on Turkey. The USSR shielded 
Syria against Turkey and Iraq. Turkey was threatened by war if a supposed Turkish 
plan to invade Syria was put into practice, and the Soviets declared that “any 
                                                 
23 Albert Hourani. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge: The Belknap Pres of Harvard 
University Press. p.363. 
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25 Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1965. White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Co. pp.196-203 cited in Pedro Ramet. op. cit. p.23. 
26 Undersecretary of State. October 14, 1957. Memorandum for theSecretary (Department of State). 
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aggression against Syria would not remain limited to this area alone.” Tirana Radio 
quoted the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov that if a possible war 
between Syria and Turkey began, “the Soviet Union will not remain with its arms 
folded. We are all ready to strike at any military adventure organized by the United 
States near our southern borders.”27 Moreover an attempt which was an indication of 
Soviet support to Syria took place just as the crisis was continuing: a small naval 
fleet paid an official visit to Syria which happened for the first time in the history of 
the USSR during a Middle Eastern or even a Third World crisis.28  
 
1.3.2. The United Arab Republic (1958-1961) 
After the return of Syrian communist leader Khalid Bakdash from exile in 
1954, the situation for Syrian communists improved parallel to improving relations 
with the USSR. However Ba’ath Party members who were motivated by Arab 
nationalism were uncomfortable about the growing influence of Syrian 
communists.29  
Despite developing relations with Moscow, the unity of Syria and Egypt 
under the name of the United Arab Republic surprised and also frustrated Soviet 
leadership. On this occasion, the Soviet Union did not support unification between 
Syria and Egypt. Because this development was a defeat of Arab communism against 
Arab nationalism, which was espoused by Nasser, and it was a defeat for the USSR, 
since Khrushchev saw himself as the leader of communists all around the world. 
                                                 
27 J. M. MacKintosh. 1962. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University 
Press. p.229 cited in Alvin Z. Rubinstein. 1988. Moscow’s Third World Strategy. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. p.130. 
28 Efraim Karsh. op. cit. p.3. 
29 Galia Golan. op. cit. p.142. 
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Also from another point of view, this unification deteriorated the Soviet Union’s 
hand and in contrast improved Nasser hand.30  
Yet, the USSR’ response was unemotional and calm to the union of Syria and 
Egypt, because Moscow did not want to pull down the bridges which had built 
between the USSR and these states and “chose to continue to protect Soviet interests 
in the Middle East through cooperation with, not opposition to, Cairo,”31 including 
Syria. Consequently “the Soviets saw no alternative but to accept this development 
‘with seeming good grace’, and to acquiesce, ‘but not without bitter recrimination, in 
the prompt extension of Nasser’s anti-communism to Syria’.”32 When Syria disunited 
from the United Arab Republic, diplomatic relations were restored and the Soviet 
embassy was again opened in Damascus.   
 
1.3.3. Summary of the Khrushchev Period 
As a summary of the Khrushchev era, the position of the USSR in the Middle 
East was generally better than when Khrushchev first came to power. If we compare 
the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, we have to say that the Soviet position in the Middle 
East was better than its predecessor, because the latter did not view nationalism as a 
negative issue and had decided to use it to advantage. 
Following the overthrow of the Iraqi government in 1958, the Baghdad Pact, 
which was accepted by the USSR as a threat to the Soviet interests, was dissolved. 
Of course ties with Syria strengthened with support against Turkey and Iraq’s threat 
to Damascus. Not only support which was given to Syria in the 1957 crisis 
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strengthened Moscow’s position, but also military and economic aid which was 
given to Syria, as well as the other states in the Middle East, strengthened Moscow’s 
position.  
The union of Syria and Egypt in 1958 interrupted the improving relations 
between Syria and USSR. After splitting up of the UAR, Soviet-Syrian relations 
between 1961 and 1963 were not as warm as in the ‘halcyon’ days of 1957. Since 
moderate and conservative politicians governed Syria, Damascus distanced its 
relations with the USSR, even though Syria needed aid to stabilize its economy and 
strengthen its position against unity supporters. With the coup, which was carried out 
on March 28, 1962, by General Zahr al-Din, the relations improved again.33 One of 
the examples for improving relations was USSR’s veto of the UN Resolution, 
submitted by the US and Britain, on condemning Syria because of continuing 
conflicts between Syria and Israel near the border.34 
In conclusion, the USSR was taken as an important and main factor in Middle 
Eastern affairs by the end of the Khrushchev era; however, the USSR was not a 
dominant state over the Middle Eastern states, neither was it dominant in Syria. The 
reasons were prohibition of the communist parties and imprisonment of communists 
and also having united with Egypt. Therefore, despite military and economic aid 
from the USSR to Syria, Syria had sometimes maintained and executed its actions 
both domestically and in foreign policy apart from the Soviet Union, as well as other 
states in the Middle East.  
Nonetheless, Khrushchev’s energetic policy was criticized for being 
unrealistic because it required huge amount of resources to sustain. By adopting 
active foreign policy towards the Middle East, Khrushchev “plunged the Soviet 
                                                 
33 Pedro Ramet. op. cit. pp.31-33. 
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Union into the thick of regional politics lying far beyond Moscow’s traditional 
security belt.”35  
 
Stalin did not want to enter the Middle East. He rather wanted to influence 
the Western Europe and the so-called Northern Tier states, Turkey and Iran. 
However, Khrushchev changed the Soviet foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Khrushchev decided to enter Middle East by using active diplomacy.  
Khrushchev tried to influence Middle Eastern states by giving them 
economical and military aid besides diplomatic support. Syria was one of his aims to 
enter in the Middle East. He did not hesitate to threaten Turkey on the 1957 Syrian-
Turkish crisis.  
However Moscow seemed to be in mire by supporting Syria that domestically 
opened for change and was internationally problem maker in the next twenty years. 
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CHAPTER II: 
CHANGES IN POLICY (1964-1991) 
 
While the USSR had the policy of spreading Soviet power gradually toward 
the rest of the world, the new President Leonid Brezhnev and the new Prime Minister 
Alexei Kosygin concentrated the state’s energy and source intensely toward the 
Middle East in order to become the dominant power. Because the Middle East has 
very important naval routes in Soviet military perceptions, this made the region a 
valuable area for the Soviet military. Thus the USSR tried to get some rights in Syria, 
Egypt, and other Middle East states. As a result, the USSR had accessed to an air and 
a naval base in Egypt, and had port rights in Syria.  
Consequently, Brezhnev followed in the way of Khrushchev in order to 
influence Syrian domestic and foreign relations. He thought like Khrushchev, his 
predecessor, who once said “We value trade least for economic reasons and most for 
political purposes.”36 If we look at Soviet efforts to influence by giving huge amount 
of economic aid in the Middle East and Northern Tier states, we can see that aid 
became more obvious after 1965.37 In Soviet-Arab relations, economic and military 
aid had an important role in addition to political support. 
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2.1. Leonid Brezhnev: ‘Cautious Detente’ and ‘Assertive Opportunism’ 
In 1965, the USSR tried to form an alliance between the Middle Eastern 
states, mainly of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. This alliance provided the ‘anti-imperialist’ 
forces against, of course, the imperialist block, namely the USA, Israel, and other 
NATO states. The USSR called Israel ‘imperialist’ in order to made Arabs link their 
struggle with the “struggle against imperialism.” Another reason of the ‘anti-
imperialist block’ was to impede the conflicts between Arabs by forming the 
alliance. The Soviet leadership recommended to the other Arab states, especially 
Egypt, to join together with Syria against the “imperialists” and Israel.  
The Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Cairo in May 1966, in order to call for a 
united front of Arab states “such as the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Iraq, and 
Syria to confront imperialism and reaction.”38 In November 1966, Egypt and Syria 
signed a defensive alliance, which was sought by the USSR, and Soviet leaders may 
have hoped that this would deter any major Israeli attack on Syria, and Egypt. 39 
After the instable years of 1961-1966 in Syria, the new regime of Leftist 
Ba’athists took over the administration. The Syrian regime, which took power after a 
coup d’etat in February 1966 (and Hafiz Assad was one of the active member who 
took duty in the coup), publicized that Syria started a major ‘socialist transformation’ 
and developed relations with the USSR. Declarations that the new regime announced 
pleased Moscow. While the USSR traditionally supported the communist leader and 
the communist party of Syria, Moscow did not support the communist party to 
dissolve the power of the left-wing Ba’ath regime that could be an advocate of the 
                                                 
38 See the report by Hedrick Smith in New York Time, May 18, 1966 cited in Robert O. Freedman. 
1991. Moscow and the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.33. 
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Soviet Union. For this reason, the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) 
founded party-to-party relations with the leftist Ba’ath party.40 
Economically, Syria needed finances to build a dam in 1966. The USSR had 
a chance on affecting Syrian domestic politics by economic aid. However the USSR 
set three provisions for economic aid according to Le Monde (April 12, 1966): 
“permission for CP chief Khalid Bakdash to return to Syria, inclusion of a 
communist in the cabinet, and permission for the communist party to publish a daily 
paper in Damascus.”41  
As a result, after all the provisions and the return of the communist leader of 
Syria, Khalid Bakdash, were realized, the USSR gave to Syria a $132 million loan 
for construction of the Euphrates Dam.42 In addition, the Soviet Union provided $200 
million in weapon deliveries.43 
With this process, Soviet economic aid came totally to $234 million and 
military aid came totally to $327 million between 1955 and 1967. Syria was one of 
three states in the Arab world, which received economic and military aid till May 
1967.44 
While the relations between the USSR and Syria were growing, Assad was 
involved in a power struggle with Jadid for leadership and accused Jadid of having 
“improper contacts with the Soviet embassy, undue economic concessions to 
Moscow, and collusion with Syrian Communists.” Indeed actions against Syrian 
Communists took place throughout 1970. However “the Soviets did not hesitate to 
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support Assad once his dominance became clear.”45 With the changing of Syrian 
leadership, the USSR’s position was questioned. Nonetheless, despite major 
governmental changes in Syria, it was closely cooperating with the Soviet Union, 
and the Soviet Union seemed to have established good working relationships with 
Assad. 
 
2.2. Confrontation with Israel 
Israel was the main concern from its establishment for Arab states especially 
those, which had common border with Israel, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. 
The Arab states caused serious problems to Israel, and the other way round. The war 
between Egypt and Israel in 1956, the guerilla attacks from Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon were some of them. Although some diplomatic initiatives were taken by 
global and regional powers until 1966 for reconciling the warring or disputing sides, 
after this time with the new Syrian regime Israel had more problems with Syria and 
Egypt.  Indeed, the new Syrian regime did not adopt a policy of only a socialist 
transformation in Syria, and close cooperation with the Soviet Union, but gave 
military and financial assistance to the Palestinian al-Fatah led by Yasser Arafat, 
which attacked Israel with guerillas.46 
The foreign policy of the USSR was divided into two main approaches when 
tensions were rising between 1966 and 1967:47 
A pro-war factional grouping, which included Brezhnev, Shelepin, the 
new chiefs in the defense ministry, and the young generals, who 
believed that the Arabs could defeat Israel; and an anti-war factional 
grouping, which included Suslov, Podgorny, Polyansky, and Kosygin, 
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who feared that the Arabs were militarily not prepared for war with 
Israel.  
These differences on the opinions towards Arabs and rising tensions in the 
Middle East made the Soviet decision makers use the chaos in the Middle East and 
continuation of no war / no peace situation for Soviet profit.48 
 
2.2.1. The 1967 June War 
In the beginning of 1967, Israelis retaliated against guerilla attacks to Jordan, 
which was supported by Syria.49 However in early April, they decided to strike back 
directly against the Syrians. The Israeli air force made a raid on the Syrian artillery, 
which shelled Israeli farmers from the Golan Heights, to silence them and also shot 
down seven Syrian jets. This defeat, which made the Syrian government lose 
prestige, and anti-Ba’ath rioting in early May signaled the Syrian Ba’athist 
government was about to fall. The Soviet leaders, who were worried about the fall 
down of their main Arab ally in the Middle East and the center of anti-western 
activity and of course feared for the future of the pro-Soviet government in Syria, 
gave false information to Egypt that Israel was planning to attack Syria and was 
concentrating 11-13 brigades on the border.50 In May 29, 1967, under the light of 
these developments, the Syrian President Nur al-Din al-Atassi and Foreign Minister 
Makhus went to Moscow. Nasser, the President of Egypt, ordered the UN troops 
away from the Israeli-Egyptian border, moved the Egyptian Army to the border, and 
made an alliance with Jordan to encircle Israel on May 30, 1967.51 This alliance 
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pleased the Soviets because of their efforts on founding an ‘anti-imperialist’ front 
against the imperialist states.  
Since Israelis knew that they would be attacked within a few days, they 
decided to strike before hand. Beginning on the morning of June 5, 1967 and ending 
on June 10, 1967, the Israelis defeated the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and 
captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Jordanian section of the West Bank of the Jordan 
River, and the Golan Heights in Syria52 in six days, that's why the war is called ‘The 
Six-day War’.   
Syria hoped that the USSR would help Syria and the other Arab countries 
would do the same politically and especially militarily, however, the USSR only cut 
its diplomatic relations with Israel. This lack of Soviet support hurt the USSR’s 
prestige. Becoming aware of dangers of loosing prestige, the USSR made moves for 
gaining its prestige again, such as rebuilding the armies of Syria and Egypt and 
offering Soviet weapons to Jordan. The USSR also took advantage of the military 
weakness of Syria’s army and its diplomatic isolation, because after having its 
diplomatic relations broken with the United States and Britain, Syria had nowhere to 
turn to get modern weapon systems and economic aid except the USSR. 
After the war, Arab states put into practice of oil embargo to the United 
States, Britain, and West Germany. This policy was the one which the USSR 
supported. However, with initiatives of the conservative Arab states to terminate it, 
the Arab summit conference assembled in Khartoum in August 1967, one which 
Syria boycotted. Thus Syria was left out of the subsidy arrangement which was 
applied by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. The other consequence of the war was 
the end of ‘anti-imperialist’ front that the USSR tried to impose. 
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Although Syria, Egypt, and Jordan were defeated in the Six-day War, Hafiz 
Assad took advantage of controlling Syria within three years. However, while the 
USSR seemed to have a certain advantage over influencing Syria, the Syrian 
communist party obstructed both the Soviet position and their fortune, since the party 
supported Salah Jadid against Hafiz Assad in the struggle of power. Hafiz Assad 
criticized Soviet interference in Syrian internal affairs and insufficient weapons 
which the Soviet supplied. Furthermore, according to the Jerusalem Post, Assad had 
said: “Why should we not boycott the Soviet Union and its supporters inside the 
country? If we do so, we can force them to review their stand. Either they give us 
what we want and what is necessary or they will lose our friendship.”53 Getting this 
warning, Robert O. Freedman thought that the USSR had kept itself away from the 
power struggle, which Assad was certainly to win. 
The USSR tried to persuade Syria to accept the Soviet backed UN Resolution 
No.24254 or to work together with Egypt to solve the Middle East crisis. However it 
was not a successful initiative, since the Syrian government was not willing to agree 
on thinking parallel with the USSR. Consequently the USSR had a limited effect on 
Syria.  
 
2.2.2. The 1973 October War 
Syria's foreign relations with the USSR improved by the 1970s, however the 
USSR was reluctant to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs especially in 1971 and 
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1972. According to Robert O. Freedman, this may have stemmed from three main 
factors:55  
In the first place, the strong US reaction to what was at least tacitly 
Soviet-supported Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970 
seems to have indicated to the Soviets that the United States was 
more willing to take action in the Middle East than it had been in 
January 1970. Second, the long feared Sino-US entente against the 
Soviet Union seemed suddenly on the horizon following Kissinger’s 
and Nixon’s visits. Finally, the long-delayed strategic arms talks, the 
centerpiece of Soviet-US détente, were nearing conclusion. 
We understand from Soviet reluctance that the USSR did not want to put at 
risk the advantages of détente by aiding its unpredictable Arab ally since Anwar 
Sadat expelled the Soviet military troops from Egypt and adopted a different policy 
from Nasser. However, the USSR gave up the policy of supporting détente as of the 
beginning of 1973. The reasons are: first of all, the Soviet-Sino conflict, which the 
Soviets feared at the beginning, did not happen, and secondly, the Nixon 
administration was in a difficult position with the Watergate scandal. Thus the USSR 
gave up its policy of risking the advantages of détente, by supporting Egypt and 
Syria.56 However Assad declared publicly before the war that he was dissatisfied 
with Soviets arm policy to Syria. 
While the USSR knew about the military coordination between Syria and 
Egypt, it did not do anything except giving them sufficient amount of weaponry. By 
joining of Iraq and conservative Arab states Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the war 
coalition, what the USSR sought for so long as an ‘anti-imperialist’ front, had 
materialized.  
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The war began on October 6, 1973, and from the first days of war, the Soviet 
Union supported Syria and Egypt by airlifting and sea lifting weaponry, as well as 
supporting them in the United Nations diplomatically, and pressured the United 
States and Israel when the war came to an end. In sum, the USSR took risks, which 
the Soviets avoided at the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, by supporting 
Syria and Egypt, and threatened Israel when Israel went on the offensive. Thus the 
Soviet Union had a very special “role in starting the war, in feeding it, and in trying 
to end it,” when Syria and its Arab allies were in a difficult position.57 Indeed 
Moscow sent “its biggest air supply operation in the Third World up to that time,” 
and even Soviet military personnel took some non-combat duties such as operating 
radar equipment and repairing tanks without approaching the front.58 However, 
despite the aid and support, Assad was not pleased with the Soviet proposal in the 
UN in October 22 and accused the Soviets of neglecting to consult with him at every 
stage of proposal.59  
Nevertheless, despite military and diplomatic support given by the USSR, 
after the war the ‘anti-imperialist front’ collapsed and the Soviet position deteriorated 
seriously among the Arab states and Syria. Moreover, Syria made crucial moves in 
order to improve relations with the US and the West. This move was not “the result 
of Syrian frustration with the Soviet Union,” but because Assad thought that the 
USSR had little influence over Israel and the US could assist in securing Syria in a 
possible negotiation with Israel. Although Syria tried to improve relations with the 
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US and the West, Assad believed in “maintenance of strong ties between Moscow 
and Damascus.”60 
On the other hand, in order to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet 
leadership tried to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel supporting their right to 
exist, while it took the opposite side by delivering arms to Syria and supporting the 
war for the Golan Heights. The USSR sent arms including SCUDs, MIG-3s, 
advanced Soviet tanks, and SAM-6s, which were long-awaited by the Syrians before 
the October War, and the Soviets increased their military advisers to nearly 3000.61 
In taking this action, the Soviets aimed to strengthen Syria’s hand in the negotiations 
and in so doing maintain the Soviet position and prevent Syria’s changing sides to 
the pro-US camp. Indeed Anwar Sadat looked at Washington to regain territory from 
Israel, thus the USSR changed its supportive policy from Egypt to Syria and Syria 
became the centerpiece of the Soviet Middle East policy.62 Even in the Twenty-fifth 
Party Congress in February 1976, Brezhnev ranked Syria at the head of the list of 
Arab friends and emphasized, “During the past five-year period we established a 
good mutual understanding with Syria. We act in concert on many international 
problems, above all those of the Middle East.”63 
 
2.3. The “Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation” 
With the initiatives of the United States, Egypt and Israel seemed to sign a 
peace agreement. In order to protest Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 
1977 and to counter “Washington’s efforts to break the Arab coalition against 
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Israel,”64 Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen, as well as the PLO decided 
to found an organization, the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation.   
After the Camp David announcements, the “Front of Steadfastness and 
Confrontation” met in Damascus in order to condemn Camp David as ‘illegal’ and 
confirm the PLO’s right to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. 
Another term that satisfied the USSR was that the front decided to “develop and 
strengthen friendly relations with fraternal states, [and] the Socialist community led 
by the USSR.”65 The USSR applied a policy of supporting the coalition at the very 
beginning of its founding despite some contradictions with specific Soviet 
‘desiderata’ because this coalition might be a solid platform to block US influence in 
the Middle East and the front could be used “as a vehicle for uniting radical Arab 
states against the West.”66  
The Soviet Union moved to strengthen its ties with key members of the 
“Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation” since the Anwar Sadat regime “has 
excluded Egypt from the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”67 Meanwhile, Assad 
visited Moscow in February 1978. The Soviets treated Assad as the spokesman of the 
‘progressive Arab camp.’ A $500 million arms deal was signed between Syria and 
the USSR.68 Assad visited Moscow again in October 1978. The result of the meeting 
was, according to Pravda, not only the joint condemnation of Camp David and of 
attempts "to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship," but also a Soviet decision to 
"further strengthen Syria's defense potential."69 Also the Soviet Union supported the 
reconciliation between Syria and Iraq, which started in the late 1970s. While 
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supporting the reconciliation between Syria and Iraq, the USSR refused to supply 
weapons because the Syrian Army was sufficiently armed, and Assad might have 
started a new war that was not convenient for the USSR. 
Consequently the relations between Syria and USSR became hotter. Syria 
abstained on the resolution of the United Nations that condemned the USSR for 
intervening in Afghanistan in early January 1980. In a Moscow Radio program, Syria 
was criticized for hardening Soviet situation in the Middle East: “It is Syria which is 
effectively standing in the way of all attempts to distort the USSR’s policy in the 
Middle East.”70 
After straining relations with the Soviets, the “Front of Steadfastness and 
Confrontation,” which was pioneered by Syria, arranged a meeting in Damascus in 
mid-January in order to condemn the United States, and divert the attention of Arabs 
from the invasion of Afghanistan, and support friendship with the USSR. Indeed the 
communiqué which declared after Gromyko’s visit to Syria at the end of January, 
pointed out to the activities of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, in order to divert 
popular criticism of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
 
2.4. The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (October 1980) 
In 1980, Syria’s contradictory position in the Arab world became more 
evident. The Iran-Iraq war broke the Arab world into two pieces. While Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt supported Iraq in the war, Syria and Libya supported Iran. As 
a result Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Syria and Libya, and the former was 
isolated from the Arab world because of supporting Iran against Iraq, policies on 
controlling the PLO and intervention in Lebanon. Moreover, in regard to the Arab-
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Israeli conflict, Assad was in a difficult position in early 1980, because the Israeli-
Egyptian peace treaty left Syria in a weakened position against Israel. Also internal 
problems caused by the Muslim Brotherhood were the main concerns that Assad had 
to face in domestic affairs.71 Karen Dawisha wrote, 
The shifts in inter-Arab alliances and the growth of American 
reliance on a military presence in the Gulf as an alternative to a 
comprehensive political solution to the Palestinian problem 
increased Syria’s isolation and forced Assad closer to Moscow.72 
Consequently, Syria had to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the 
USSR in October 1980. This treaty, which showed Moscow’s importance to the Arab 
world, gave the Soviet Union a stronger foothold in Syria. Brezhnev pointed out the 
importance of the treaty,73 
The task of the Soviet-Syrian treaty is to help improve the situation 
in the Near East and establish there a real and just peace. This treaty 
has no other objectives and it is not directed against third countries. 
This is a treaty in the name of peace, not in the name of war. 
Despite being considered as a victory for the USSR, Assad was unwilling to 
sign the treaty, which he resisted for nearly ten years.74 However, isolation both 
abroad and domestic made Assad sign the treaty. On the other hand, Assad sought to 
keep flexible in his relationship with the USSR. According to Robert O. Freedman, 
Assad wanted to show to the USSR that “Syria was not as isolated as either its 
friends or foes may have thought,”75 by signing a “unity” agreement with Libya 
before signing the treaty with Moscow. Indeed, this “unity” agreement bore fruit. 
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Gaddafi paid $1 billion to Moscow in September 1980 for Syrian debts of arms 
purchase.76 
Nonetheless, there were disagreements between the ‘allies’. One of them was 
the Syrian support to Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, while the USSR was neutral. 
However, Syria still endorsed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and stressed 
that the USSR was needed in the Middle Eastern problems. In Assad’s visit of 
October 1980, military assistance was discussed in order to strengthen Syria’s 
defense capability. As a result, Syria got long-range missiles, T-72 tanks and MIG-25 
airplanes; the USSR got rights to use the harbors of Lazkiye and Tartus as military 
bases.77 
Yet, for Moscow, military aid might cause a number of problems in the Soviet 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. Firstly, Assad, who was worn out by internal 
and external difficulties, might have the intention to create an international crisis with 
Israel, or one of his Arab adversaries, and then drag the USSR into the crisis. 
Secondly, Assad might cause problems for the Soviets in its Middle Eastern policy 
when Soviet policy was already in a state of confusion because of the Iran-Iraq war. 
Since Assad followed a policy, which put the Soviets in a difficult position, 
independence from Moscow on a number of occasions in the past, he might do so 
again.78 
However, after signing the treaty, in the following years Syrians still 
complained that the USSR did not provide support and arms supplies that they 
wanted. After the annexation of the Golan Heights, in January 1982, Syrian Foreign 
Minister, Abdul Khaddam, visited Moscow in order to obtain a security treaty like 
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the USA and Israel had. The Soviet leadership resisted the quest, because of Syria’s 
intention to drag the USSR in an unwanted adventure. Moscow discouraged Syria’s 
desire to be a closer ally.79 
 
2.5. The Syria-Jordan Crisis (November 1980) 
After the Sinai II accord between Egypt and Israel was signed, Syrians 
“concluded that Egypt was no longer an active factor in the confrontation with 
Israel.” From then on, Syria and Jordan relations improved noticeably. The ‘firmest’ 
and ‘quietest’ alliance between Syria and Jordan lasted until 1980.80 The Jordan 
crisis in November 1980 was one of the events of Assad’s decision to apply a 
different policy from that of the Soviets foreign policy. These turns and changing 
policies of Assad always hampered the aim of ‘anti-imperialist front’ in the Middle 
East that the USSR wanted for so long.  
The crisis occurred after the Arab summit in Amman. Syria boycotted the 
summit, with Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen that supported Iran in the war, and 
also pressured PLO, and Lebanon not to participate in the summit, fearing a final 
decision that would condemn Syria for supporting Iran.  
However in the aftermath of the summit, the Syrian army concentrated on 
Jordan’s border in order to neutralize the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
supported by Jordan and made raids against the Syrian regime as Damascus 
claimed. However the main reason was probably Jordan’s support of Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq War politically and economically contrary to Syria’s position of 
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supporting Iran. Thus relations between Syria and Jordan, which had been a close 
ally of Syria from 1973 to 1979, cooled significantly.81 
Assad, in order to show Jordan that the USSR supported his policy, chose 
the time of Vasili Kuznetzov visit to Damascus for the finalized Soviet-Syrian 
treaty. Once again, Assad wanted to drag the USSR into the crisis in the Middle 
East. However, Kuznetzov made a speech in Damascus stressing the importance of 
Soviet-Syrian treaty for "eliminating hotbeds of dangerous tension in the Near East," 
and calling for the peaceful solution of problems between Arab countries.82 “By 
emphasizing the peaceful nature of the treaty at the peak of the crisis, the USSR 
prevented Syria from sheltering behind the treaty,”83 thus Syria’s hand was weakened 
by peaceful declarations against Jordan. 
However, the Soviet attitude during the crisis was nearly neutral, though this 
confrontation ended the rapprochement between the USSR and Jordan. Moreover, 
King Hussein postponed his visit to Moscow and said in an interview on December 2, 
1980 that he requested from the USA arms supplies in order to resist the Soviet 
backed Syrian army and added that he put aside the intentions on receiving the arms 
supplies from Moscow.84  
 
2.6. The Syrian Missile Crisis (April 1981) 
In the early days of April 1981, Syria attacked Phalangist positions near Beirut 
and Zahle. While Syrian attacks near Zahle escalated, Israel shot down two Syrian 
transport helicopters, which were involved in the operation, in order to pressure Syria 
to loosen its siege of the Christian town of Zahle. For this reason, Syria deployed 
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surface-to-air missiles batteries into Lebanon near Zahle.  Menachem Begin, Israeli 
Prime Minister, declared that if the missiles were not withdrawn into Syria, Israel 
would destroy them.85    
Like in other crises, the USSR was caught by surprise with Assad’s decision 
to move missiles into Lebanon. Assad decided by himself without consulting the 
USSR, although there was an article in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
about consulting each other in case of breaking peace and about the security 
environment. Moreover the US sought for support of the USSR in the peace-making 
process, and this showed that the USSR was still an important actor in the Middle 
East. On the other hand, “the USSR sought to discredit America’s suitability to play 
the role of impartial mediator between Israel and Syria.”86 Thus the Soviets 
emphasized that Syria’s policy in the crisis is a “purely defensive 
measure….[which]falls short of threatening Israel’s security in any way.” In addition 
to verbal support from the USSR, the Soviets sent their Mediterranean squadron to the 
Lebanese coast, signed a Soviet-Syrian agreement on economic and technical 
cooperation on May 14, increased military support for Syria and put on practice an 
joint amphibious practice on July 6-7, 1981.87  
On the other hand, the USSR did not want to be dragged in an unwanted war 
between Syria and Israel, although Syria was a close ally of Moscow. The USSR also 
did not want Syria’s involvement in a war against Israel that might cause the collapse 
of the Syrian regime. Thus, due to the advantages and dangers, Moscow carried out 
the dualist policy. On the one hand Moscow tried to damage the reputation of US 
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meditation efforts, and on the other hand the USSR tried decreasing the possibility of 
war between Syria and Israel.88  
 
2.7. The Syria-PLO Crisis 
The Palestinians resistance movements got strong after the defeat of regular 
Arab armies by Israel. While they were getting bigger, they had conflicts with each 
other about getting recruits, funds, and prestige. But, at the beginning of the 1960s, 
the USSR kept a low profile on the Palestinian resistance movements or mainly the 
guerrilla organizations. But Syria and Egypt strongly supported the Palestinian 
organizations. From mid-1969, the Soviet interest increased after the death of Nasser, 
and the USSR decided to get involved in guerrilla organizations.  
The conflicts between Palestinian guerrilla organizations made them form a 
united organization that was named the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).89 
Syria supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization at the beginning. Because 
Assad’s main aim was to control the PLO through whose help he would become the 
leader of Arab nations.  
With the interest of the USSR in guerrilla organizations, the PLO was more 
important on Moscow’s Middle East policy. From then on, the USSR tried to tighten 
its relations with the PLO, but Moscow hesitated on recognizing and bridging 
diplomatic relations with the PLO since it was considered as a terrorist organization 
all over the world, and because the PLO defended the idea of liquidation of Israel 
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which was never accepted by the US and Israel. For this reason, Yasser Arafat, who 
was the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) after the death of 
Ahmed Shukeiry, was invited to Moscow in February 1970 by the Soviet Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Organization in order to not to be invited by the Soviet government. 
However, after Arafat was treated in China with great respect with a high-level 
reception the very next month, the USSR made the Middle East communist parties 
found a guerrilla organization, Ansar, in order to influence the PLO. But Ansar was 
not able to influence the PLO from the inside.90  
The conflict between the PLO’s leader Yasser Arafat and Syria’s president 
Hafiz Assad was one of the serious concerns of the USSR. Syria under the Jadid 
regime had supported the Palestinian Resistance Movement in the way of supplying 
arms and other facilities. However, after the coup of Assad in 1970, Syrian policy on 
the Palestinian issue changed. Assad began to put some restrictions over the 
Palestinians and political activities of the movement in Syria. Assad also put 
restrictions on guerrilla operations undertaken by the PLA which had to be approved 
by the Syrian army command. Both leaders tried to exert influence over Palestinian 
peoples in Lebanon and Syria and tried to be the ‘legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.’91 
 The crisis between Assad and Arafat was evident in the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1976. The Syrian involvement in civil war created a very serious 
problem for Soviet diplomacy when battles between Syrian and PLO forces took 
place in July 1976. Since both Syria and PLO were the allies of the USSR, the USSR 
did not take sides in the war. As a result, both sides complained about the Soviet 
policy, lack of aid and support. This two-handed policy of Moscow did not put out 
                                                 
90 Robert O. Freedman. 1991. op. cit. pp.44-45. 
91 R.D.Mclaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W.Snider. op. cit. p.277. 
 36 
the fire between the PLO, which was an adjunct of Soviet policy, and Syria, which 
was a key component in the Middle East, especially after Egypt became closer to the 
US. However, at the time of invasion of Lebanon, while Arafat clashed with Assad, 
the latter also made public declarations of support to the Palestinians as its patron 
state did. But the Soviet criticism increased on Syria’s treatment of the PLO and 
Arafat after Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and the Soviets even accused Syria of 
“stabbing the PLO at the back.”92 Brezhnev sent two letters to Assad on Syrian 
actions towards the PLO emphasizing that “the Syrian leadership should take all 
possible measures to end its military operations against the [Palestinian] Resistance 
and Lebanese National Movement.”93 Moreover, Hafiz Assad used leftist and 
Islamist groups in the PLO in order to weaken Arafat’s position. Despite USSR’s 
suggestions, Assad did not give up of controlling the PLO from inside. In 1983, 
Assad supported Fatah, one of the most important of the PLO’s numerous factions, in 
organizing a rebel movement against Arafat in order to force him out of Lebanon, to 
control the PLO but not to get the PLO out of the Arab-Israeli conflict.94 
The USSR’s vested interest in Syria-PLO conflict was a rapprochement between 
the sides instead of choosing one of them. In any case, Moscow chose Syria in the 
confrontation between Assad and Arafat, since Syria was the main Arab state opposing 
US diplomacy in the Middle East and allowing Moscow to use the Syrian naval and air 
force facilities as well. The other reason was that the PLO became distant from the 
USSR and Syria’s orbit because of supporting the US proposal on solving the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
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2.8. Syria in Lebanon 
After the PLO was ousted from Jordan because of its threat to King Hussein’s 
regime, it settled in Lebanon in the 1970s. The settlement complicated Lebanon’s 
interior dynamics. Accordingly, in 1976 the Lebanon Civil War took place. It was 
between the Christians and Muslims and Palestinians over power politics. The war 
became more complex when Syria got involved militarily in June in order to aid the 
Christians and end the civil war.95 However there were no formal diplomatic 
relations between Syria and Lebanon until 1976 and Lebanon stayed neutral in Arab-
Israeli conflict. Thus, “Syria’s main interest in dragging Lebanon into the Arab-
Israeli confrontation,” was the real aim of Hafiz Assad who thought that the 
Lebanese army was too weak to hold the Lebanese-Israeli border and the border 
“constituted a dangerously soft underbelly in the Arab defenses.”96 
The Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 pleased and benefited Moscow at 
the beginning of the crisis, because of growing Syrian influence and possibility of 
rapprochement between the PLO and Syria. However, later, the USSR demanded 
from Syria to end the occupation of Lebanon as mentioned above. On the contrary, 
Assad warned Moscow on reducing Soviet influence in Syria and improving 
relations with the US if Soviet pressure on Syria lasted. One of Assad’s main aims in 
threatening the USSR on reducing Soviet influence was not only getting support 
economically and military but also; 97 
Assad opted to maintain a good dialogue with the US mainly as a 
potential instrument in his confrontation with Israel. Indeed, beyond 
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his intention to use the US as a counterweight to Soviet demands 
and as source of technological and economic assistance, Asad 
essentially endeavored to weaken American support for Israel, or 
alternatively to use US influence over Israel to advance Syrian 
interests.  
Indeed the Soviets did not like some policies of Assad, such as “intervening 
in Lebanon, trying to emasculate and control the PLO, flirting with the West.”98 
The occupation and intervening in Lebanon’s domestic affairs lasted six years 
and this lasting intervention made Syria isolated from the Arab world. However, 
while the Soviets took risks in the 1973 War, in 1982 Moscow was unwilling to take 
risks because of the United States’ increasing power. The USSR even did not do 
anything except sending new arms after Israel destroyed 29 Soviet-built SAM sites 
and over 80 Syrian MIGs.99 Syrians wanted support by the Soviet Union in any way 
due to the treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; however the Soviet Union indicated, 
“their treaty did not require them to protect Syrian forces outside Syrian territory.”100 
This lack of Soviet support in the Lebanon crisis of 1982 was explained by the 
western analysts in three ways:101 
One group of analysts attributed the Soviet hesitancy to the 
succession crisis and former Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's 
deteriorating health. Another group pointed to Soviet logistical 
difficulties in the conflict, and Soviet unwillingness to deploy troops 
abroad in the face of significant opposition. Others contended that 
Moscow was preoccupied with the continuing crises in Poland and 
Afghanistan, the strategic arms negotiations, and efforts to 
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encourage nuclear freeze forces both in the United States and 
Western Europe. 
Israel also hesitated in the conflict with Syria in Lebanon in 1982. Since Syria 
signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR in 1980, and the 
Soviets attempted to reload Syria’s losses of over estimated eighty planes in Lebanon 
in order to signal “Israel not to carry the war to Syria,”102 Israel had some drawbacks 
on going into armed conflict with Syria. For this reason, Israel preferred to sign a 
cease-fire agreement with Syria in Bekaa not because of Syrian danger but for fear of 
Soviet interference. With this agreement Assad left the PLO alone against Israel.103 
 
Brezhnev used the same instruments as his predecessor, Khrushchev, did. 
They were economic and military support. However, despite support was given to 
Syria, Syria was far away of defending Soviet interests in the Middle East. Indeed 
Brezhnev was careful in détente period especially from the beginning of the 1970s he 
left the détente.  
From the 1970s, Brezhnev adopted foreign policy in a more opportunistic 
way that he tried to use the Middle East conflicts for Moscow’s benefits. However, 
while using conflicts for its benefits, Syria sometimes caused problems for Moscow 
that left it in a difficult situation.  
Hafiz Assad did not always do what the Soviet Union thought. On the 
contrary, he wanted to drag Moscow into the conflict with Syria. However in the 
1980s, Syria did not find the Soviet Union in every conflict that it caused. Mikhail 
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Gorbachev applied a different foreign policy than his predecessors that can be 
summarized as defensive and peaceful approach. 
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CHAPTER III: 
DEFENSIVE PERIOD (1982-1991) 
 
3.1. The Transition Period 
In the transition period, there were two presidents in charge, Yuri Andropov 
and Konstantin Chernenko. However these elderly leaders had a short tenure of 
twenty-eight months. Yuri Andropov and his successor Konstantin Chernenko could 
influence Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East minimum.  
 
3.1.1. Yuri Andropov 
Andropov had to suport Syria diplomatically and politically support. Soviet 
reliability in the Middle East was in question then and even Libya made comments 
on insufficient Soviet support, the poor performance and quality of the Soviet 
weaponry, and the United States began to control the diplomatic initiative in the 
region by establishing the ‘Central Command’ to watch over its Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF). In military terms, the Soviets sent SAM-5 missiles to Syria in order to 
show that Soviet support to Syria continued and increased.104 Andropov had to give 
Syria new weapon systems, because indeed Andropov’s general attitude towards 
Syria was positive in comparison to other Third World ‘self-declared Leninist states,’ 
thus “he proved to be one of the most ardent advocates of the Syrian connection.” 
Although Andropov was “skeptical of the claims of self-declared Leninist states in 
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the Third World and loath to undertake new financial or other commitments,” Syria 
was to this exception in his general rule.105  
The USSR proposed a new peace plan, for which the Arabs showed no 
support since the main allies of the Soviets were little influence over the Arab 
summit. Even the USSR’s main allies, Syria, Libya, and the PLO, were in conflict 
with each other, like Hafiz Assad and Kaddafi were in conflict with Arafat, because 
Arafat was flirting with the Reagan Plan.106 Assad, after Soviet weaponry arrived, 
used the situation to improve his political position in the Middle East and in 
Lebanon. Assad, supported by Libya and Iran, claimed not only to end the Israeli 
occupation in Lebanon, but also the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Knowing Assad’s 
policy of dragging the USSR into an unwanted war, the USSR did not allow Syria to 
decide when the missiles would be used. 
In March 1983, the USSR put forward its foreign policy towards the Middle 
East in an aggressive but limited mood. By warning Israel not to attack Syria, but 
without mentioning the Soviet- Syrian treaty, and claiming that Israel was ‘playing 
with fire,’ the USSR sought to rebuild its position in the Middle East.107 Nonetheless 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, stated that the policy of the USSR in 
Lebanon was in support of “the withdrawal all the foreign troops from the territory of 
Lebanon, all of them. Syria is in favor of this,” and added “We do not share the point of 
view of extremist Arab circles that Israel should be eliminated. This is an unrealistic 
and unjust point of view.” This statement showed that the USSR did not want to 
alienate its main ally Syria, and supported the existence of Israel, as well as the Arab-
Israeli conflict resolution in a political way. However, the USSR and Syria did not 
accept the withdrawal agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed upon in principle 
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on May 6, 1983, which was an attempt of the US. The reason was that the Soviets did 
not want the US to diplomatically benefit from this agreement.108 Syria was trying to 
make its hand strong in the political arena and was looking for support from Moscow 
according to the treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Khaddam, Syrian foreign 
minister, stated that, in case of a war between Syria and Israel, "We believe that the 
USSR will fulfill its commitments in accordance with the [Soviet-Syrian] treaty."109 
Nonetheless the USSR was unwilling to be involved in a war in Lebanon.  
  
3.1.1.1. Confrontation with the U.S.A. in Lebanon (September 1983) 
As of the end of August 1983, a new crisis began: warfare between the 
Lebanese government and the Shiites. The conflict was small in scale, but it 
escalated rapidly. While the conflict was escalating, Syria did not feel comfortable 
with threatening the US clients because the US battleship, New Jersey, was sailing in 
the neighborhood.   
The USSR reacted to the crisis very carefully. The government made a 
statement in Pravda that the Soviet Union was ‘deeply concerned’ about the 
probable intervention of the US in Lebanon. But there was a change from the earlier 
policy of the USSR in that there was no mention of withdrawal of Syrian forces from 
Lebanon, while the Soviets did not threaten the US. Indeed when Syrian positions 
were under fire by the US, the USSR did not do anything except to alarm its southern 
troops and warned Syria “not to provoke the United States” when Syrian forces in 
Lebanon fired on US planes.110 On the other hand, the USSR benefited from, and 
also was content with, the confrontation between the US and an Arab state, Syria. 
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In sum, the USSR behavior was very cautious in the crisis in order not to 
escalate the confrontation to a superpower confrontation. Syria complained about the 
lack of Soviet support during the crisis. However after the cease-fire, the USSR, in 
order to lessen Syrian discontent with the lack of Soviet support, sent off modern SS-
21 ground-to-ground missiles. At the same time, the USSR carried out the policy of 
decreasing its military relationship with Syria in order to avoid a possible war 
between the US and Syria in a probable breakdown of cease-fire. Under these 
circumstances, on the third anniversary of the Soviet-Syrian treaty the relationship 
was at low ebb.111 
Nonetheless, while the USSR tried to decrease its probable involvement in 
and after the crisis, Assad attacked Arafat and his supporters in Tripoli in December 
1983. This dangerous policy raised the possibility of a US and Syrian confrontation 
again. Assad planned to crackdown on Arafat’s forces simultaneously with the visit 
of Khaddam to Moscow. Assad wanted to show that Moscow supported his policy on 
Lebanon. However Moscow did not please with Assad’s policy on the PLO, because 
it wanted to see the PLO as an independent actor in the Middle East rather than as 
part of the Syrian Army, but “the USSR was unwilling to offer Arafat anything more 
than verbal support.”112 Thus Assad made his Soviet ally support Syria. In order to 
prove to the world that the USSR was supporting Syria, Assad and other government 
members made comments to the media such as “the possibility of a Soviet-American 
confrontation if a new war broke out,” and “the USSR would never to allow Syria to 
be defeated.”113 In spite of making these comments, Syria could not get more than 
moral support against the US from the USSR. The crisis ended with the withdrawal 
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of the US troops from Lebanon, after 250 US marines were killed in a car bomb 
attack on their residence.  
 
3.1.2. Konstantin Chernenko 
The USSR was in a good position when Konstantin Chernenko came to 
power. Because the US and Western troops had left Lebanon, the Lebanese-Israeli 
agreement failed and the Reagan Plan was shelved. Thus Chernenko had a chance to 
re-make policy with Lebanon Crisis, less dependent on Syria. Indeed Chernenko put 
in practice the new Middle East policy beyond the pro-Soviet camp.  
Hafiz Assad was dissatisfied with Chernenko’s policy and he was doubtful 
“the USSR’s readiness to maintain its extensive military support of Syria.” In March 
1984, Geidar Aliyev made a visit to Syria to reassure Assad. However Assad 
expected more than such phrases of support his main ally. Assad paid a visit to the 
USSR on October 15, 1984, four years after the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation was signed. Assad was successful in increasing economic and military 
aid to Syria at this visit. According to Foreign Report, Assad requested a moratorium 
on Syria’s military debt that the Soviets ignored.114 
During his visit, Assad was told that the Soviets would withdraw their 
personals in air defense units from Syria, and leave the SA-5 batteries to Syrians. 
This seemed like a Syrian achievement, but in real it was an attempt to express 
Moscow’s unwillingness to meet risks on behalf of Syria.115 Syrians made no direct 
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criticism of the Soviet unwillingness, but they made attempts for diversifying their 
weapons resources through buying French or other Western arms.116 
 
3.2. Gorbachev Period: ‘Defensive’ 
At the beginning of 1985, problems in the USSR became evident. Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who took power in March 1985, identified the problems as economic, 
social and foreign relations. Thus Mikhail Gorbachev stated repeatedly that he 
intended to change the direction of Soviet foreign policy, mainly in the Third 
World.117 
In order to divert resources from military needs to civilian needs, he had to 
get a ‘respite’ in the arms race. So he had to persuade the US, Europe and NATO that 
the ‘Soviet threat’ was diminished. However, efforts to convince the US and others 
did not exactly begin start of Gorbachev’s tenure. Indeed, he sent to Afghanistan 
fresh powers and intensified the Soviet interest, moreover he sent to Libya SAM-5 
missiles during his first year in office.118 Since the 27th party congress in 1986, 
Gorbachev thought that “a resolution of the war in Afghanistan might pave the way 
for increased efforts to settle other regional conflicts, including those in the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf,”119 and expressed this openly. 
By the beginning of 1987, Gorbachev put into practice the ‘new thinking’ in 
Soviet foreign policy, which had five major principles. Gorbachev pointed out to “a 
need to abandon…..the ‘zero-sum game’ approach to the Third World,” “the 
‘balance of interests’ which would take into account the legitimate interests of the 
                                                 
116 Mustafa Talas’s interview with Liberation (Paris), November 30, 1984 cited in Efraim Karsh. 
1988. op. cit. p.84. 
117 Melvin A. Goodman. 1990. Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World. Washingto D.C., The 
Institute for National Strategic Studies. p.5. 
118 Robert O. Freedman. 1991a. op. cit. pp.205-206. 
119 Melvin A. Goodman. op. cit. p.8. 
 47 
USSR, the US, and regional states,” “reliance should be placed on political means for 
the resolution of regional conflicts,” and “there will be no possible detente in US-
Soviet relations if there is no settlement of the most serious regional conflicts 
especially in the Middle East” because of organic ties between regional conflicts and 
superpower confrontation.120 
The worsening situation in the Middle East was becoming very important for 
Moscow with the growing domestic, economic and social problems. These made 
Gorbachev apply a more peaceful policy toward the region. Indeed three central 
problems for Moscow which caused its influence to diminish were: the Hussein-
Arafat agreement, which could be related to the Reagan plan and allowed Egypt to be 
reintegrated into the Arab world that the USSR had not wanted so far, and the Iran-
Iraq war, which could strengthen the US position in the Middle East, compounded by 
events in Lebanon that still caused problems for Moscow. Contrary to the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation articles, “Assad frequently moved to create political and 
military crises without appearing to consult with the USSR in advance, thus 
frequently presenting Moscow with a fait accompli.”121 
The USSR tried to influence the Middle Eastern states by proposing its new 
peace process. The Soviet Union had to show that its influence was still continuing in 
the Middle East and make efforts to end the conflict in Persian Gulf, because the 
prolongation of war weakening the Soviet position in the Middle East. Moreover the 
United States strengthened its position and seemed to win the zero-sum game in the 
Middle East if the war continued.  
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3.2.1. USSR’s Attitude towards Syrian-Lebanon- the PLO Relations 
USSR was critical about the ‘heavy involvement’ of Syria in Lebanon from 
the beginning of its intervention. However, this critical manner did not allow the 
Soviets change their attitude toward Syria especially at the beginning of the 
Gorbachev era. Although Gorbachev gave signs of supporting Syria, he tried to 
change the Soviet policy toward the Middle East and Syria in the following years. 
Nonetheless he “refrained from acknowledging Syrian domination of Lebanon” as 
his predecessors did, thus Moscow hesitated to associate with Syria in Lebanon 
because of independent Syrian actions in Lebanon.122 
However, the USSR looked to benefit from developments in Lebanon. Indeed 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which was announced in January 1985 and ended 
in June 1985, was taken by the USSR “as a victory for ‘Lebanese patriotic forces,’ as 
well as for its major Arab ally, Syria.”123 The USSR was also pleased with 
decreasing in the possibility that the crisis between Syria and Israel might expand 
into a superpower confrontation. 
Moscow’s approval of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon did not last long 
since Moscow had to choose between one of two allies, Syria and the PLO, which 
were still in conflict with each other in Lebanon. Syria still supported the militia 
groups against Arafat in Lebanon and wanted unification under Syrian influence. The 
Syrian-supported Shiite militia, Amal, attacked Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut 
in the early days of June 1985, which was referred to by Arafat as “the second 
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massacres of Sabra and Satilla.”124 As in 1976, in the Lebanon civil war, and in the 
1983 confrontation between Syria and the PLO, Gorbachev had a difficult choice like 
his predecessors had. In sum, like his predecessors, Gorbachev chose to be neutral 
and called for an immediate cease-fire, but Syria was criticized in the Arab world. 
In order to look for support from the Soviet Union, in his unscheduled visit to 
Moscow in June 1985, Assad wanted from Moscow “to coordinate their response to 
King Hussein’s search for support for an international conference that would include 
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation… to ease Soviet-Syrian tensions over Syria’s 
support of Palestinian opposition to Arafat’s leadership and over its policy in 
Lebanon; and to discuss increased arm deliveries.”125  
However Syria worsened the situation in the Middle East for the USSR by 
attacking Palestinian refugee camps in the following years. Syria did not attack 
camps itself, but Syrian-supported Amal besieged the camps as in 1985, in order to 
prevent Palestinian military existence, from October 1986 to April 1987 for six 
months. Assad again visited Moscow at the end of these developments. Gorbachev 
announced in the dinner speech that the USSR was “saddened by the disunity, 
friction, and conflicts in the Arab world which are vigorously exploited by 
imperialist and their henchmen.”126 Assad pointed out Syrian support for Arab 
solidarity and Palestinian problems without giving any signals for conciliation with 
the PLO. The other problems that were taken up in the visit were the Iran-Iraq War, 
Arab-Israeli conflict and military aid. On the Iran-Iraq War, the USSR sought 
initiatives from Assad on ending the war, but Assad only mentioned his displeasure 
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about the war. On Arab-Israeli conflict, Assad pointed out the increase in US military 
aid, and underlined Israel’s will to occupy Arab territories but resisted an 
international conference. Assad might have wanted to affect Gorbachev for an 
increase in military aid to Syria. In any case, during the dinner speech by Gorbachev, 
the USSR was still concerned with Syria’s defense capability at a proper level. This 
visit bore fruit in the next few months because the USSR gave to Syria two 
squadrons (24) of MIG-29s.127 
 
3.2.2. Soviet Policy towards Terrorist Activities 
In a new crisis, Syrian-backed Shiite militia, Amal, hijacked an American 
TWA plane in the late of June 1985, created a known problem that the USRR got 
used to: dilemma in aiding Syria. During the crisis, Gorbachev invited Hafiz Assad 
to Moscow which was taken by Syrian side as demonstrating the Soviet support to 
Syria on the Middle Eastern problems as well as with the PLO. Releasing hostages 
solved the crisis. The Syria factor was evident in the peaceful solution that Moscow 
was so pleased. Because Syria avoided being in a possible confrontation with the US 
with the solution, and also Syria’s prestige among the Arab states increased.128 
The USSR was troubled with kidnapping of its three diplomats and one 
embassy doctor in Beirut on September 30. The kidnappers, who called themselves 
the Islamic Liberation Organization, wanted from the USSR to force Syria to stop 
attacks on Tripoli. The kidnap ended with the murder of one of the hostages and 
Syria’s halt of its attacks on Tripoli. Despite USSR’s condemnation of terrorist 
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activities as ‘criminal,’ in the UN Resolution of December 9,129 four months later, 
two of its clients, especially Syria and Libya, were accused of terrorist activities by 
the US and were threatened with a counter attack by the US, which the USSR did not 
want. Even the president of the US, Reagan, declared, after the second attack on 
Libya, that the US was suspicious of Syria’s involvement in terrorist incidents, and if 
there was ‘irrefutable evidence’ about Syria’s involvement, the US should attack.130 
The US also accused the USSR of not doing enough about terrorist activities.  
All these events took place when Gorbachev looked for peaceful solutions in 
the regional and worldwide problems and thus USSR did not support terrorism. 
Moreover Gorbachev discouraged Syria from supporting terrorism. Thus, because of 
not being sure about Soviet support, Assad condemned terrorism and added that 
Syria had intention to work together against terrorism.131  
 
3.2.3. Israel in Soviet-Syrian Relations 
Due to Gorbachev’s peaceful approach, Moscow desired to renew its 
relations with Israel. However Soviet clients responded to this approach in a negative 
manner, especially Syria. This negative manner forced the Soviet bureaucrats to 
declare that the USSR would not restore its ties with Israel till Israel gave the Golan 
Heights back to Syria. However, the USSR made attempts to restore its relations with 
Israel whether Israel’s desire to include the Soviets in the Middle East peace 
process.132  
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However at the last days of 1985, Syria faced with another missile crisis 
against Israel that bothered the USSR. Hafiz Assad, moved SA-2 surface-to-air 
missiles batteries near the border of Lebanon and SAM missiles into Lebanon. 
Although the USSR declared that Syria’s movement had a defensive in nature, 
Moscow was concerned about a possible war between Syria and Israel, which might 
drag the superpowers in. Thus, in order to show not wanted to take side in the 
conflict, the USSR withdrew its personnel, who taught Syrian soldiers on SAM 
batteries.133  
During the whole year of 1988, the USSR announced and declared several 
times of the message that was about to find our political solutions in the regional 
conflicts in the nuclear age which was first said by Gorbachev to Assad in the 1987 
meeting. Having supported the policy of political solutions, the USSR had attempts 
on developing the relations between the USSR-Egypt, and the USSR-Israel. 
However this policy was not welcomed by Syria, because Syria had problems with 
Egypt, the PLO, and Iraq. Syrian was displeased with Soviet developing relations 
with Egypt, the PLO and Iraq which harmed Soviet’s long-wanted Arab unity - in 
which the Soviet call for an ‘anti-imperialist basis’ in the past was changed by 
Gorbachev as ‘constructive and realistic basis,’ - and also had a negative policy 
towards Israel which might be changed into possible Syria-Israel war by Syria.  
Thus Syria claimed that, despite improving relations between the USSR and 
Israel, Israel had still armed in a strongly manner and Syria had to obtain more in 
balancing the power. Despite several reports on important arms deals between the 
USSR and Syria134 after the Lebanon war, some of the arm deliveries to Syria 
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delayed. Because of not having all the weapons that Syria wanted from the USSR, 
Syria was reported on a possible deal with China on M-9 missiles.135 
 
3.2.4. Disintegration of the USSR and Relations with Syria 
Coming to end of the USSR, Gorbachev administration showed their 
intentions on relinquish the Soviet hands over the Third world especially in military 
meaning. For example; at the beginning of 1989, the USSR withdrew its troops in 
Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of troops, the USSR pulled back his hands over 
the Third World by means of active military presence and the USSR waited for 
improvements in Soviet-US Relations and Soviet-Middle Eastern states relations 
which might take the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan as a threat (e.g. Iran).  
The USSR plan on Syria was clear: Gorbachev and Shevardnadze plan to 
steer “Syria in the direction of a negotiated settlement with Israel but with a greater 
commitment than ever before.” For this reason, the USSR ambassador to Damascus, 
Aleksander Zotov, stated that the USSR did not support Syrian demands on ‘strategic 
parity’ with Israel.136 Moreover, in Assad’s visit to Moscow in April 1987, 
Gorbachev pointed out that “the absence of Soviet relations with Israel was 
abnormal” and against Assad demands on ‘strategic parity he added “the reliance on 
military force has completely lost its credibility as a way of solving the Middle East 
conflict” which means a new military action against Israel would not be supported by 
the USSR.137 Indeed, in Soviet-Syria military deliveries, falling from the average of 
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$2.3 billion per year to less than $1 billion per year in 1985-89 tenure138 was very 
important sign of the decreasing Soviet support to Syria and peaceful approach of 
Soviet policy in the Middle East. Syria’s dept to the USSR was reached to a $16.5 
billion that Syria had difficulty in paying. 
The USSR’s Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, paid a visit to the Middle 
Eastern states in February 1989, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, in order to show changes in the USSR’s foreign policy and continuous 
supportive policy towards to the Arab states. Syria was his first stop that he might 
show Syria as the main ally for the USSR in the Middle East. He also repeated 
parallel statements, like Gorbachev in meeting with Assad in Moscow in 1987, 
which was about a conflict had to be solved in peacefully and politically way in the 
nuclear age that means the USSR did not support Syria in a possible war, which 
made Syrian leader not happy.139 Furthermore, Shevardnadze called Syrian’s 
attention to ‘more arms’ did not mean ‘greater security’ and in July 1989, the first 
deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told Arab League leaders to stop 
violence in Lebanon by pressing Syria.140 
 
The Soviet Union did not have power to endure its influence not only in Syria 
but also all over the world. Gorbachev knew that the Soviet Union had to have ‘New 
Thinking’ in its foreign relations. Indeed this new approach necessitated peace rather 
than war, so Gorbachev wanted to show whole world that the Soviet Union was not a 
threat anymore.  
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Thus he did not support Syrian aggressive stance and gave little support 
militarily and economically. Actually the Soviet Union could not do more than this 
because of its poor economy. As a result Gorbachev adopted the Soviet foreign 
policy with a more defense approach. Syria took its part from this approach by not 
taking economical and weaponry support that Assad hoped.  
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PART B:  
RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA 
 
CHAPTER IV: 
TURKEY’S WESTERN ALİGNMENT (1945-1960) 
 
4.1. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria 
Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria is parallel with Turkish Foreign Policy 
towards the Middle East or towards Arab states. In this case, before explaining 
Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria, it is best to investigate the factors that have 
affected relations between Turkey and Syria privately but between Turkey and the 
Arab Middle East in general.  
 The factors can be summarized in three heading as follows:141 
a. The Historical Aspect 
b. The Western Influence 
c. The Soviet Influence 
 
4.1.1. The Historical Aspect 
The historical aspect that has affected relations between Turkey and Syria did 
not come from the birth of the Republic of Turkey but the Ottoman Empire. In the 
19th century, great powers were interested in the lands of the empire in North Africa 
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and later in the Middle East. The intentions of great powers to carve Ottoman 
territory resulted in the loss of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt by France and Britain 
respectively.  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had to establish 
generally close relations with Germany against Britain and France because of the 
strong desires of Britain and France to dominate and occupy the Middle East region. 
Indeed, during World War I, both states signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement in order 
to divide up the region. Moreover Britain and France encouraged the Arabs to 
declare independence from the Ottoman Empire and had them revolt against the 
empire. However the main goal of Britain and France was not founding independent 
states in the Middle East but rather founding new states under their ‘mandate’ as 
agreed in the San Remo Conference by both sides.142 
Because of being rebelled against and stabbed in the back by the Arabs, 
relations between Turkey and Arab states declined and became cold and distant. The 
other important factor was the new republic’s desire to advance to the level of the 
contemporary world. As Atatürk declared; 
Turkey embarked on a path which led it away from its past, and 
from the Arab countries with which its past had been so closely 
connected: that of re-creating society on the basis of national 
solidarity, a rigid separation of state and religion, and a deliberate 
attempt to turn away from the Middle Eastern world and become 
part of Europe. 143 
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The abolishment of caliphate by Turkey is regarded as one of the reasons of 
enmity of Arabs against Turkey by some authors but the Arabs did not react to the 
abolishment decision seriously.144  
 
4.1.2. The Western Influence 
The new Republic of Turkey under Atatürk routed itself to the contemporary 
world in every aspect, i.e. economically, culturally, and diplomatically. After signing 
the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey was advancing towards the West more rapidly. This 
integration with the western world moved Turkey away from the Arabs and therefore 
Ankara avoided showing interest in the independence movements in the Middle East. 
Because any support to the independence movements in the Middle East could 
impede Turkey’s relations with the contemporary world.  
Turkey had had good relations with the West since it was founded. After 
France accepted to give independence back to Syria in 1936, Turkey refused to leave 
the Sancak145 under Syrian administration. After several discussions between Turkey 
and France, Ankara did not agree with France on the Sancak issue. The League of 
Nations, to which France and Turkey referred the Sancak issue, accepted the Sancak 
as a separate entity (‘entite distincte’)146 in 1937. France and Turkey guaranteed the 
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territorial integrity of the Sancak. Hatay, which the Sancak named itself after 
decision of the League of Nations, decided unification with Turkey in 1939.147 
Until 1939, although the coldness in relations was generally psycological, 
after unification with Hatay the coldness became more evident. Then the enmity 
between two sides became solid and made the relations more distant. In addition to 
the decision of unification of Hatay, the alignment of Turkey with the West was 
more evident after the World War II. The USSR’s demands from Turkey of some 
rights, considering the revision of the Montreux Convention and territorial demands 
from eastern Turkey,148 made Turkey become closer to the West. As Turkey became 
closer to the west, due to the Arab attitude towards imperialistic states, the Arabs 
hesitated to establish good relations with Turkey.  
 
4.1.3. The Soviet Influence 
The USSR supported the new Turkish liberation movement, which was then 
led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends, in the last days of the Ottoman Empire 
against the imperialistic states. Even, while the War of National Liberation was 
going on, the USSR and Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship on March 16, 1921. 
After the Republic of Turkey was founded, the USSR established a good relationship 
and supported Turkey. On December 17, 1925, Turkey and the USSR signed the 
Neutrality and Nonaggression Treaty. However, after World War II, the USSR under 
Stalin made attempts to put Turkey under pressure through some Soviet claims.149 
These attempts along with other reasons such as fear of military and diplomatic 
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isolation and concerns about membership in every Western organization made 
Turkey align itself with the West. After the death of Stalin, the USSR under 
Khrushchev tried to influence and align with the Middle Eastern states. Thus, from 
1955, the USSR emerged as a factor, affecting Turkish Foreign Policy towards the 
Middle East in a negative and direct way.150 
With Khrushchev’s initiatives, the Middle Eastern states, especially Egypt, 
built contacts with the USSR in a friendly atmosphere and became closer with the 
Soviets. On the other side, having close relations with the West, especially with the 
USA, after World War II, Turkey chose its position on the western side because; 
In an emerging bipolar international system, neutrality could no 
longer guarantee the security and integrity of the Turkish state. 
Taking the new geo-strategic context into account, the deep rooted 
suspicious against the West had to be overcome. 151 
 
4.2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria before the 1950s 
Since the Atatürk era (1923-1938), Turkey sought to build good relationship 
not only with the West but also with USSR and Arabs. After the War of National 
Liberation, Turkey did not demand anything from the post-Ottoman states, thus there 
were no conflicts between Turkey and Arab states. Even during Atatürk’s tenure, 
Turkish Foreign Policy was based on establishing good relations with the Middle 
Eastern and other Eastern states. Consequently on July 8, 1937, the Saadabad Pact 
(Nonaggression Pact) was signed in the Saadabad Palace in Tehran between Turkey, 
Iran, Irak and Afghanistan. 
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The main reason for Turkish attitude towards the region lied in Turkey’s 
advancement in the contemporary world and the Lausanne Treaty (1923-1924) that 
Turkey signed was a statement that Ankara did not want conflict with Syria or other 
Arab states. Another reason was that the Middle Eastern states were under the 
mandate of France and Britain before and during World War II. This peaceful 
attitude continued during and after World War II. Although Turkey established good 
relationship with Arab states, it did not seek to build close relations with them. 
However after World War II, before Turkey aligned itself with the West against the 
Soviet threats, Ankara continued to establish good relations with Syria and other 
Middle Eastern states. For instance, Turkey signed some treaties with Iraq in the 
beginning of 1946 and on March 6, 1946 and recognized Syria’s independence as 
well as Lebanon’s.152 
However the coldness in relations between Turkey and Syria was caused by 
the unification of Hatay with Turkey. Although Turkey recognized Syria’s 
independence, the unification was not officially recognized by Syria. Turkey and 
Syria shouldered the crisis peacefully with the mediating initiatives of the Prime 
Minister of Iraq, Nuri Said Pasha. As a result Turkey did not demand from Syria to 
recognize the unification of Hatay, and Syria formally accepted not to push the crisis 
forward.153 Contrary to Syrian acceptance, Syrian officials sometimes put forward 
the unification of Hatay on political arena.154 
Turkey tried to improve its relations with Syria and other Arab states in the 
post-world war period although the crisis of Hatay remained between Syria and 
Turkey. Meanwhile, the Palestinian issue was growing to a crisis between Israel and 
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the Arab states. Turkey objected to the partition plan along with other Arab states in 
1947, for which the Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli sent an appreciation message 
to President İsmet İnönü.155 However, the USA, USSR and France accepted the 
partition plan in the United Nations by 1947. The USSR strategy in accepting the 
plan was due to its aim to diminish Britain’s influence in the region and according to 
some authors the intention of the USSR to build a communist state in the Middle 
East.156 
However with the growing Soviet threat to Turkey and Turkey’s alignment 
with the USA and the West made Turkey widen the gap with Arab states after 1947. 
Although Turkey opposed to the partition of Palestine along with Arab states in the 
United Nations by 1947, after the war between Arabs and Israel in May 1948, 
Ankara joined the Reconciliation Commission of Palestine, which was founded by 
the UN, but objected to by the Arabs. From then on, Turkish Foreign Policy seemed 
to change its attitude on the Palestinian issue. Indeed, after receiving aid from the 
USA and establishing tight relations with Washington because of the growing Soviet 
threat perceptions, Turkey recognized Israel in March 28, 1949.157  
Before the recognition of Israel, Syria looked for support from Turkey since 
Damascus had not established close relations with the Soviet Union and Turkey was 
a strong state in the region. Indeed the Prime Minister of Syria, Jamil Mardam, came 
to the Turkish Embassy to request Turkish support over a possible Jewish state which 
was founded in Palestine. Moreover Syrian President, Shukri al-Kuwatli, repeated 
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the Syrian request for Turkish support.158 However, contrary to the Arab states, 
Turkey recognized the newly founded Jewish state for a number of other reasons, 
such as fear of military and diplomatic isolation and concerns about membership in 
every Western organization and also the growing Soviet threat. Syria and the other 
Arab states were disappointed with Turkey’s decision regarding recognition of Israel. 
 
4.3. Under the Democrat Party (1950-1960) 
According to some, Turkey’s commitment to Westernization ended on May 
14, 1950 elections. Indeed, with the handover of government in May 14, 1950 
elections, Syria and Arab states thought that the westernization of Turkey stopped 
and the country even turned its face towards the Middle East. For example; Syrian 
President Hashim al-Atasi declared to Cumhuriyet on November 18, 1950 that 
President Celal Bayar’s  statements in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 
establishing good relationships with the Arab world pleased not only Syria but the 
whole Arab world. In another declaration on December 16, 1950 to Cumhuriyet, he 
saw the Democrat Party administration as a revolution for Turkey and added that 
Syria and other Arab states were pleased with Turkey’s friendship. He explained to 
Cumhuriyet on May 13, 1951 his previous thinking of ‘revolution’ that with this 
‘revolution’, which contained several arrangements of religious issues, Syria felt 
Turkey’s advance to Islam increased.159  
On the contrary, Turkish Foreign Policy towards the West did not change. 
With growing and lasting Soviet threat from north and apparent Soviet intentions in 
the Middle East, Turkey still kept close to the West. In August 1950, the Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs, Fuad Köprülü, pointed out to the threat of communist imperialism, 
which was spreading through the world as well as in the Middle East. He emphasized 
Turkey’s importance for providing peace and security to the Middle East and added 
that if the cooperation between Turkey and the USA were to be established legally, 
this would provide great opportunities for Middle East peace.160 Under these 
circumstances, the Democrat Party pursued this [joining NATO] policy with respect 
to lessening Turkey’s security concerns. Even though Turkey had a strong intention 
to become a member of NATO, the country did not have the opportunity to realize it 
before the Korean War. Thus the Democrat Party saw the war in Korea as a chance 
to join without taking permission from the Assembly. In claiming to join NATO, not 
only the Democrat Party but also Republican Peoples Party and the press were all 
aligned almost in every respect. However Turkey’s request to join NATO was not 
accepted in September 1950 because of “geographical problems”161 since it was not a 
Euro-Atlantic country. During the same year and the next year the discussions of 
Turkey’s membership in NATO between members continued and as a result Turkey 
was invited in on September 21, 1951. The USSR gave Turkey two diplomatic notes 
on November 12-13, 1951 objecting to Turkey’s membership in NATO and revealed 
displeasure.162 
Britain proposed a Middle East defense pact, the so-called the Middle East 
Command (MEC), with the USA, France and Turkey in October 1951. Against 
Egypt’s rejections, Turkey with its allies defended the MEC that the potential 
command would serve as an important factor in the Middle East peace and security 
environment. Turkey’s positive attitude was because of the admittance of Turkey to 
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NATO that was still discussing in the NATO council. Egypt’s rejection to the MEC 
caused another proposal by the USA and Britain, the Middle Eastern Defense 
Organization (MEDO) in June 1952.163 
Turkey under the Democrat Party government focused its foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. While some differentiations with the western powers’ 
policy could be observed before 1950, was now in tandem with its western allies. 
Arabs refused the MEC and the MEDO initiatives. Consequently, it can be said that 
from then on the policy towards the Middle East took shape under the auspices of the 
West.164 
 
4.3.1. The Baghdad Pact 
Turkey’s membership in NATO as of February 18, 1952, was a milestone in 
Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East, because it was a definite 
positioning of foreign policy parallel to the West. The views on defending the MEC 
and MEDO also assisted this alignment.  
The USSR gave a diplomatic note against intentions of founding the MEC 
under the premise that the MEC had aggressive attributes and Soviets could not 
overlook such aggressive plans on their border.165 Nonetheless the United States 
insisted on founding a defensive pact in the Middle East because of its growing 
influence especially after the Korean War. For this reason J.F. Dulles, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the United States, paid a visit to the Middle Eastern 
states between May 11 and May 18 1953, but found no suitable situation to establish 
a defense pact. Dulles emphasized that Arabs were dealing with problems against 
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Israel, Britain and France, thus they did not pay attention to Soviet communism.166 
On the contrary, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran were aware of the menace of Soviet 
communism. In this way, Turkey and Iraq began to discuss the pact in the early 1955 
and publicized a declaration of their intentions to establish the pact. Following the 
visit of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, to Iraq on January 6, 1955, Menderes 
visited Syria and Lebanon in order to persuade them to join the pact. Leftist groups 
of the Syrian parliament criticized Menderes and there were demonstrations of 
students against Turkish initiatives.167 
Menderes met with the Syrian Prime Minister Farouk al-Khoury, and other 
ministers. However, Syria hesitated to join the pact; Syrians reacted negatively to 
join in Turkish-Iraqi cooperation since Syria thought that “Turkey was a ‘gendarme 
of American imperialism’ in the Middle East.” One of the reasons of Syrian negative 
reaction to the pact was that it might be used as an instrument to undermine the cause 
of Arab nationalism and encircle Syria.168 Despite the opposition of Syria and Egypt 
along with other Arab states, Turkey and Iraq signed the treaty in Baghdad on 
February 24, 1955. The main aim of the pact was to tie the Middle East defense 
system indirectly to the Western defense system against the ‘Soviet menace.’ 
However, most of the Arab states had anxieties about the West more than the Soviet 
Union because Arab states thought that the West was responsible for founding Israel 
at the heart of the Middle East.169 
Consequently, following the signing of the Baghdad Pact, the Arab world was 
generally divided into three: Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia, Lebanon-Jordan and Iraq. In 
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the Arab world, while Iraq was pushed into isolation because of signing the treaty, 
Lebanon and Jordan were neutral, but Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia were against 
the pact. The reason of Arab rejection of the pact was that they did not feel the 
‘Soviet menace’ as much as the so-called Northern Tier states and they thought that 
the West and Israel were more dangerous than the Soviets.  
Indeed, after the Baghdad Pact, Egypt and Syria signed a treaty in order to 
strengthen military, political and economic status of the Arab world, and one week 
later Saudi Arabia joined the group.170 Syrian foreign policy of struggling against the 
‘Turkish Pact,’ was a clear indication of Syrian views of the pact.171 However Turkey 
was also unhappy about Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia initiatives to found a pact and 
their declarations about the Baghdad Pact. Menderes accused Syria of continuing a 
policy of opposition to Turkey and he worried about the relations between both states 
if this policy would last. Following Menderes’ declarations, both states gave to each 
other diplomatic notes and the relationship was assessed to be in a ‘serious 
situation.’172 
The Soviet Union was also unhappy with the signing of the pact, because the 
USSR felt uncomfortable about ‘Soviet menace’ that was fabricated by the USA and 
Britain. The Soviets even accused the USA and Britain of craving for the pact for 
their national interest, not for the supposedly Middle East peace, and emphasized 
Soviet foreign policy towards the Middle East and their independence movements in 
the past. Since the formation of the pact and the establishment of foreign military 
bases in the Middle East had direct effects to the security of the USSR, the Soviet 
Union could not remain unresponsive to the situation of the Middle East. As a result, 
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“Upholding the cause of peace, the Soviet government will defend the freedom and 
independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East and will oppose 
interference in their domestic affairs.”173 
USA and Britain’s main aim of founding the Baghdad Pact was to contain the 
Soviet Union in its region, but it was not realized. The Soviet Union even began to 
interfere in the region more frequently after the pact was signed in order to “defend 
the freedom and independence of the countries” in the region. Indeed Egypt signed 
an arms supply treaty with Czechoslovakia in September 1955.174 
Turkey saw the Baghdad Pact, which was initiated by Britain and USA, as a 
useful instrument in establishing good relations with the Arab states, in addition to its 
security policy. However, while Turkey supported the Baghdad Pact to establish 
good relationships with its neighbors and Arab states, it became distant to these 
states in real, because Turkey undervalued Arab states’ position towards the West. 
Most of the Arab states took western powers as friend of Israel, so they were against 
any initiatives of the West as well as Syria. Syria, under the leadership of Egypt, took 
its position next to Egypt, so the relations between Turkey and Syria were strained 
and came to be defined as a ‘serious situation.’ The USSR had benefited from the 
situation of opposition to the western initiatives of obstructing the Soviets in the 
Middle East. While the USSR had established good relationships with Syria and 
others, Turkey became distant definitely with Syria and others.175 
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4.3.2. The 1957 Crisis 
Nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in July 1956 led to crisis not only 
between Israel and Egypt, but also Britain and France took sides with Israel. 
Members of the Baghdad Pact organized a meeting during the crisis. The pact 
members, in order to support Egypt and other Arab states about crisis, demanded that 
Britain and France withdraw from territories of Egypt but approved the US attitude 
in the crisis.  
The demand that was publicized by the Baghdad pact members did not 
change and soften the Arab states` policy towards Turkey, because Turkey, with 
other pact members, did not condemn Britain and France. Turkey’s move of calling 
back its ambassador from Israel also did not help make Arabs change their policy 
towards Turkey.  
 This negative attitude towards Turkey lasted in the following year. While 
Syria established good relationship with the USSR by signing treaties and 
agreements with the Soviet Union, Syria had a crisis with Jordan at the beginning of 
1957. The crisis built up and turned out to be a crisis between Syria and the USA in 
the following months. Syria accused three American diplomats of supporting a coup 
d’état against Syrian regime and deported them from Syria. USA declared the Syrian 
ambassador to Washington persona non grata and deported him.  
Turkey watched these events very carefully. Indeed, Turkey worried about 
developments that took place in Syria especially after a Syrian left-wing party got 
stronger after the elections. Some writers in newspapers publicized Turkey’s 
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anxieties, which were Syrian alignment to the USSR, thus becoming a Soviet 
satellite.176 
The USSR claimed that Turkey had an aggressive attitude towards Syria and 
amassed troops on the border. However Turkey did not accept Soviet claims on 
having an offensive position towards Syria, and added that troop concentrations were 
not against Syria, but because of NATO maneuvers. Following the Soviet claims, 
Syria gave a diplomatic note to stop the concentration near the border. Turkey 
refused Syrian demands and explained that the crisis was because of Soviet 
intentions of using Syria against Turkey by making Syria as arms depot in its 
responsive note 177 
In permeating tensions, while the USSR took sides with Syria, the USA 
supported Turkey against Syria and the Soviets. Indeed both superpowers accused 
each others of creating the crisis and showed their resolution on defending their ally.  
The crisis ended with softening relations between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union from the end of October 1957. Khrushchev attended the reception at the 
Turkish embassy in Moscow on October 29, 1957 and gave peaceful messages to 
Turkish, American and British ambassadors. Softening relations with the Soviet 
Union brought up softening relations with Syria. Consequently, discussions that took 
place in the UN about the crisis between Syria and Turkey ended taking back two 
resolution drafts given by Syria and Norway.178 
Turkey had confronted Syria directly for the first time after 1945. The crisis 
also directly affected Turkish-Arab relations. Alignment of Turkey with the West 
against the Soviets made Turkey become distant to Syria and other Arab states as 
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well. Some authors wrote that Turkey reacted to Syria in a severe way by 
concentrating troops on the border because of Syria’s accumulation of excessive 
weaponry and growing Soviet influence. Turkey could responded to Syria in a more 
peaceful manner by calling Syria’s attention to growing Soviet influence, and by 
calling UN attention to Syria’s weaponry policy, not massing its troops on the 
border.179  
Nevertheless, Turkey’s sensitivity about the crisis did not deter the USSR 
from cooperating with Syria; and this event even allowed the USSR settle in the 
Middle East easier. Turkish attitude towards Syria during the crisis did not soften 
Syria’s attitude towards the West, but on the contrary, made Syria search a 
protector.180 This search led Syria to unify with Egypt in 1958 after the crisis ended, 
Syrian armament still continued under the United Arab Republic (UAR) and 
dependence of the UAR to the USSR began to increase. Thus, the troubling relations 
with Syria continued after the crisis between Damascus and Ankara. Turkish Foreign 
Policy toward Syria broke down between 1958 and 1961.  
Nonetheless, Turkey’s western-integrated Middle East policy did not halt in 
this period. Indeed Turkey’s attitude toward the revolution in Iraq under Menderes’ 
administration was an important indication of its pro-active and western-integrated 
policy toward the Middle East. Turkey accepted the revolution in Iraq as a movement 
that was inspired and motivated externally, and emphasized that the revolution aimed 
to abolish the Baghdad Pact that was a peaceful and stabile component of the Middle 
East.181 Moreover, according to Hayrettin Erkmen’s notes, Turkish General Staff 
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made plans to intervene in Iraq as was proposed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin 
Rüştü Zorlu and was approved by Prime Minister Menderes along with President 
Celal Bayar. The claim was also verified by President Eisenhower’s memoirs that 
Turkey decided to intervene in Iraq and wanted both physical and moral support 
from the USA.182 However Turkey’s western allies discouraged Ankara from 
intervening in Syria and Iraq.183 
Another development took place in Lebanon at the same time with the 
revolution in Iraq. There were conflicts in Lebanon between the supporters of 
Camille Chamoun, the western-oriented president of Lebanon, and his opponents. 
Turkey, in order to support western-oriented Chamoun, supported the US initiatives 
on intervening in Lebanon and even gave permission to the US to deploy its troops at 
the İncirlik Base of Adana. Turkey, with Iran and Pakistan, declared that they 
received the US initiatives in Lebanon with pleasure.184  
In sum, Menderes and the Democrat Party elites followed the same core 
issues as their predecessors did: “First, on the maintenance of the integrity and 
sovereignty of the Turkish state: second, on foreign policy as a means of Western 
integration.”185 However, while Turkey integrated into the Western world, Ankara 
was back in the Middle East as a ‘staunch ally’ of the West and therefore Turkey was 
increasingly isolated from the Arab world because of being exactly a ‘staunch ally’ 
of the West.  
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4.3.3. Transboundary Water Courses 
During the first period of relations, Turkey and Syria had little troubles with 
each other on water issues. Indeed, while Syria had troubles with Israel in Arab-
Israeli conflict and its internal power struggles between Syrian notables both in 
political and military life, Damascus had little concern on water. Thus, Syria declared 
and sent diplomatic notes to foreign embassies in Damascus by July 5, 1944 that 
Syria was respectful of the treaties and agreements, which were signed by France on 
behalf of Syria before it gained independence.186 Turkey had also no concern on 
water because of its sufficient and immense water resources. Consequently, water 
was not a problem for either side until 1955. 
However, after the crisis of the Baghdad Pact, Turkey and Syria faced 
another conflict that passed with less trouble. Syria decided to build a dam on Asi 
River.187 However, the river, which flows out from Syria and reaches the 
Mediterranean Sea through Hatay, was important for Turkish agriculture in Hatay; so 
Turkey was concerned about the water resources that Syria allowed to flow. Thus 
Ankara offered to negotiate over the water issue, including the Euphrates River.188 
However Syria rejected to negotiate water problems.189 The water issue remained a 
dead letter only to become inflamed after the 1980s. 
 
From 1945 to 1960, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria was similar to 
Turkish foreign policy towards all Arab states. Actually Turkey turned its face 
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towards the West since the founding of the new Turkish Republic and only made 
some non-aggression treaties with the Middle Eastern states bilaterally.  
After Atatürk’s death, with the growing Soviet influence and demands on 
Turkey, Ankara tied itself to the West with important ties. From then on, especially 
under Menderes’ administration, Turkey followed a more active policy in the Middle 
East than before. Turkey seemed to support western interests in the Middle East. 
Indeed the policies adopted were only to defend itself against the Soviet Union as 
well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As of the mid 1960s, however, Turkey 
incrementally began to adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy which included 
rapprochement with Middle Eastern countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
 
CHAPTER V: 
TURKEY’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE ARAB WORLD (1960-1980) 
 
5.1. Disappointment with the West and Rapprochement with Arab States 
In the beginning of 1960 there was a coup d’etat in Turkey against the 
Menderes government by the Armed Forces. When the May 27 1960 coup d’etat 
took place, Menderes had scheduled a visit to Moscow in June 1960. The visit itself 
was not the reason of the coup, but it can be said that Turkey wanted to restore and 
establish a relationship with the Soviet Union after the strained period of World War 
II.  
There was no indication of change in Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East as in 1950s; on the contrary Turkey still interfered in Middle Eastern 
crises. Turkey recognized Syria’s independence after the dissolution of the UAR, and 
evaluated the dissolution as an ‘internal improvement’ for Syria.190 Recognizing 
Syria’s independence, which strained the relationship between Turkey and Egypt, 
was a continuing policy of Turkey by interfering in Middle Eastern problems as it 
did in the 1950s.191 Thus Turkey still followed the West in the Middle East. 
After the coup, the new regime followed the foreign policy of its 
predecessors. Selim Sarper, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the military regime, 
emphasized that Turkey was committed to all international commitments, e.g. 
NATO, CENTO, and also indicated Turkey’s wish on improving relations with the 
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Soviet Union.192 From then on, Turkey applied a multi-faceted foreign policy, 
because of political reasons and factors, between the West, Socialist states and the 
Third World.193 From the beginning of 1960s, all political parties, either leftists or 
rightists including the extremist factions, agreed on developing relations with the 
Arab world.194 The reasons of Turkish multi-faceted policy are mentioned below: 
The main reason was that Turkey had several disappointments about western 
policies- especially of the US- from the beginning of the 1960s. After the Cuban 
missile crisis between the US and the USSR, the US withdrew the Jupiter nuclear-
armed missiles that were deployed in the beginning of 1961. Turkey benefited from 
withdrawing of the missiles because by withdrawing the missiles the possibility of a 
nuclear war in Turkey lessened. However, Ankara was disappointed at the very 
beginning of the crisis, because of thinking that the USA left Turkey be subjected to 
Soviet nuclear missiles. After opening the archives, it was seen that the withdrawing 
of the missiles was a “trade-off between the US and the USSR at the expense of 
Turkey.”195  
The missile crisis was the first dissension of Turkey-the US relationship but 
not the last. While Turkey’s disappointment was still continuing, Turkey looked for a 
consensus between its allies to intervene into the Cyprus because of intensifying 
violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, in 1964, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, the President of the US, sent a letter to the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to 
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warn İnönü  “if Turkish action on the island would invite a Soviet attack, then NATO 
was not obliged to defend Turkey.”196 This letter was an unexpected reaction from 
the US and made Turks disappointed about Western intentions. By sending the letter, 
“the United States had exploited Turkey’s political loyalty,”197 and the letter caused 
“the reappearance of the deep-rooted suspicious against the West” in Turkey.198 The 
US and West did not support Turkey’s rights on the Cyrus issue and this policy was 
accepted as an unsupportive and unjust policy by Turks while Turkey was a ‘staunch 
ally’ of the West. Thus there were some discussions on ‘real’ benefits of alignments 
with the West in Ankara, and Ankara examined its commitments to the US and 
adopted a more diversifying foreign policy.199 
On the other hand, although Turkey had strained relations with the USSR 
beginning from the end of Word War II, the Soviet Union changed its attitude 
towards Turkey to a most friendly atmosphere after warning Ankara on the Cyprus 
issue. The USA warned Turkey also on the Cyprus Crisis. Following the USA 
warning, the USSR changed its attitude towards Turkey. Having seen “the sign of a 
crack in the NATO alliance prompted the Soviets alter their position,” and the Soviet 
Union declared neutrality in the crisis.200 After the bilateral visits of ministers, 
Turkey and the USSR signed an economic agreement on constructing “important 
industrial projects, including an iron and steel complex, an oil refinery, and an 
aluminum plant, and Soviet loans to Turkey for economic projects have been larger 
                                                 
196 Nur Bilge Criss. 1997: “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963,” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 20(3): 97-122. 
197 Faroz Ahmad. 1984. “La Politique Exterieur Turque,” Les Temps Moderne 41(456-7): 156-174 
cited in Dietrich Jung with Wolfango Piccoli. 2001. opcit. p.139. 
198 Dietrich Jung with Wolfango Piccoli. 2001. opcit. p.139. 
199 Yasemin Çelik. 1999. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger. p.47. 
200 Galia Golan. 1990. Soviet Policies in the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.249. 
 78 
than those to any less developed country in recent years,” estimated nearly at $200 
million.201  
The coldness in relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union was one of 
the reasons of negative Turkish attitudes towards the Arab world throughout the 
1950s. However beginning with the second half of the 1960s, following 
improvements in relations between Turkey and the USSR, Turkey established 
relations with the Arab world. The public opinion of Turkey over the Soviet Union 
improved especially after the UN Resolution No. 2077voting on December 18, 1965 
about the Cyprus issue.202 Having abstained in the UN voting, the USSR and other 
socialist states gained prestige among both the left and right wing of Turkish political 
parties. This improvement also affected Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East because most of the Arab states saw the USSR as an ally. 
Following no support from the West on the Cyprus issue, Turkey was also 
disappointed with the manner of Arab states in the UN. In 1965, Turkey was not 
supported by Arab states in a resolution of the UN on the Cyprus issue. Syria, UAR 
and Lebanon voted against Turkey’s interests in Cyprus, while the other Arabs states 
abstained and Saudi Arabia was absent.203 As a result, this difficult situation that 
Turkey faced led Ankara to become distant from the western world and search other 
alternative foreign policy ways: normalizing relations with the Arab states and 
USSR. The reorientation of foreign policy after the UN voting was not limited with 
the Arab countries and Soviet Union; it was expanded towards the Warsaw Pact and 
Balkan countries.204 According to Dietrich Jung: 
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The Turkish move to normalise its relations with the Arab world 
was, in the first place, a response to these disappointments with 
western policies. In the second place, it was an attempt to overcome 
the now painful isolation to which the foreign policy of Menderes 
had brought the country. 205 
Also growing tensions with Greece on the Cyprus issue and unjust position 
perceived of the West with a decreasing ‘Soviet menace’ from the north led Turkey 
to move towards the Arab world.206 Thus rapprochement with the Arab world 
accompanied improving relations with the USSR.  
The Turkish attitude towards the Arab states was received positively by both 
the leftist groups because of opposition to the West- especially the US, and the 
rightist groups because of religious reasons.207 Thus, Turkey was in a suitable 
situation to establish ties with the Arab states because there was a consensus between 
the public opinion and political powers.  
Turkish-Syrian relations began to improve under these circumstances. From 
the beginning of the 1960s, Turkey wanted to restore and reestablish relationship 
with Syria and this accelerated mainly from the second half of the 1960s. Turkey’s 
first test of rapprochement with the Arab states was the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. 
 
5.2. The 1967 ‘Six-Day’ War 
Relations between Syria and Israel were strained in the period between 1956 
and 1967 and tensions increased as of the beginning of 1967 because Palestinian 
guerrillas attacked from the border of Syria. Thus Israeli officials made declarations 
that an operation against Syria would be unavoidable if the attacks went on. 
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The USSR benefited from this situation by spreading disinformation of a 
supposed Israeli plan to attack Syria. The Soviet aim by spreading disinformation 
was not only to unify the Arab states under an ‘anti-imperialist’ basis but also to help 
Syrian government against domestic conflicts and external pressure from its Arab 
neighbors.208 The reason to protect the new Syrian government by the Soviet Union 
was because it was a socialist government and applied leftist policies among those 
Arab states including Egypt and Iraq, thus the continuation of the government was 
very important for the USSR.  
Turkey publicized its position in the crisis on May 28, 1967 that discussions 
over the crisis was considered according to the UN laws and supported by the 
principles of right and justice. Turkey also added in the declaration that it kept in 
mind the good relationships between Arab states and Turkey.209 
By declaring ‘keep in mind the good relationship between the Arab states and 
Turkey,’ Ankara announced its support on behalf of the Arab states in which Al-
Ahram wrote the official opinion of the UAR (or Egypt) that Turkey gave guarantees 
to the UAR that Turkey would not permit to use the bases of NATO against Arab 
states and did not concentrate its troops on the Syrian-Turkish border.210  
While the war was still continuing, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, made a speech in the Grand National Assembly and Senate about 
Turkey’s good will on ending the war. He also made a statement to Cumhuriyet that 
the use of NATO bases in Turkey against Arab states was not allowed by the Turkish 
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government.211 Indeed Turkey drew a new and different foreign policy line by not 
permitting to use the base against Arabs after giving permission to the US to use 
İncirlik Base in Lebanon Crisis in 1958.   
After the war Turkey sent aid of food, clothing and medicine to those Arab 
states that had heavy causalities in the war, beginning firstly with Syria and other 
states respectively.212 Turkey supported the Arab states in the UN after the war by 
declaring clearly that it did not accept the land gains of Israel in the war and 
emphasized that the UN insisted on returning the lands to the Arab states from 
Israel.213 
Turkey’s foreign policy in the 1967 War was a clear milestone of Ankara’s 
new foreign policy towards the Arabs states. Turkey tried to establish a 
rapprochement between itself and the Arab states. Mainly Syria and the UAR were 
pleased with the new Turkish attitude. Indeed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Syria, I. Makus, publicized that Turkey’s attitude in the crisis and war created 
appreciation and gratitude among Syrians.214  
Turkey continued its rapprochement policy towards the Arab states and of 
course with Syria after the war. “Turkey displayed a certain willingness to act against 
Western interests in the Middle East.”215 Turkey denied any intention of founding a 
defense pact, which was proposed by the US in 1968, in the Gulf including Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, because this pact made Turkey become distant to 
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its Arab neighbors as in the Baghdad Pact.216 At the end of 1968, Turkey did not 
permit an exercise of NATO that would take place at the Turkish-Syrian border 
despite pressure from NATO. 
 
5.3. The 1973 War 
The year of 1970 led to a great change in Syria: Hafiz Assad came to control 
the administration by eliminating Nur al-Din al-Atasi and other party elites. Change 
of power took place while a crisis between Syria and Jordan was still going on. The 
crisis was about Jordan’s operation against Palestinian guerrillas, who had been 
living in Jordan after the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 as refugees, were out to topple the 
Jordanian regime. Syria wanted to intervene to the conflict between the Jordan 
Armed Forces and Palestinian guerrillas but its operation failed because of Syrian 
domestic problems (e.g. struggle for power between Assad and Jadid) and other 
external factors (e.g. lack of Soviet support). Syrian domestic struggle for power 
ended with handover of the power by Hafiz Assad. The new regime under control of 
Hafiz Assad seemed to be more moderate and peaceful than the former regime.  
Turkey applied a cautious policy, which was a continuation of the post-
Menderes period and different from its policy of the 1950s, and supported neither 
Syria nor Jordan in the crisis. As after 1967 War, Syria appreciated Turkey’s attitude 
towards the crisis between Syria and Jordan. Because, during the crisis, Turkey 
denied access to US paratroopers and war planes at Incirlik Base and emphasized 
that Turkey did not permit to use the NATO bases in operations against Arab states. 
Turkey did not allow the US fleets use the Iskenderun harbor either.217 Turkey 
rejected nearly all offers from its ally in the crisis because the Turkish-Syrian Crisis 
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in 1957 was due to Turkish support of western policies in the Syrian-Jordanian Crisis 
and Turkey was disappointed with Johnson’s letter in its Cyprus policy.  
Turkey’s rapprochement with the Arab states continued after 1970. Although 
Syria improved its relations with the USSR, Turkey continued its policy of 
supporting Arabs in the international arena, but being neutral in inter-Arab problems.  
Turkey’s support of Syria and Arabs continued in the 1973 Arab-Israel War. 
Before the war, Turkey declared that Israel had to withdraw from Arab territories and 
made statements about Arab rights. While the war was still going on, the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Syria and Egypt requested political support from Turkey in the 
war. Turkey declared that it did not approve Israeli occupation of Arab territories by 
using force and emphasized that accepting the legitimate rights of Arabs could 
provide permanent peace.218 
During the war, some Arab ambassadors requested from Turkey humanitarian 
aid on October 14. Four days later Turkey informed the US that the bases in Turkey 
could not be used for sending aid to Israel,219 which was a continuation of Turkish 
Foreign Policy from the mid-1960s. Turkey also provided some indirect support to 
Syria by permitting Soviet flights that was rumored to bring arms to Syria over 
Turkey. Moreover Turkey offered to Syria its southern ports in order to transport 
materials that were sent from other third countries.220 However, despite Turkey’s 
general support on two articles of the UN Resolution No.242, which included Israeli 
withdrawal from occupied territories and Israel’s right on having secure and 
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recognized territories, after the 1973 War Turkey supported the withdrawal of Israel 
from occupied territories.221  
Turkey followed a supportive policy towards Arab states and Syria after the 
1973 War. Although Turkey supported the legal rights of Palestinians before the 
War, Ankara discussed independent Palestine state in its post-war policy. Turkey 
also recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1976 and permitted the PLO 
to open an office in Ankara in 1979.222 The second indication of continuity in 
Turkish Foreign policy was Ankara’s position on an inter-Arab problem: The 
Lebanon Crisis in 1976. Turkey did not take sides in the crisis but preferred to be 
neutral and not to interfere in the crisis.  
 
5.4. Terrorism and Its Implications 
From the founding of Israel in 1948, the Middle East was in a period of 
change and chaos. However considering the terrorist organizations and movements 
the Middle East was quiet until 1967. Following the defeat in 1967 Six Day War, 
Arabs were in a hopeless situation which led to growing terrorism among the Arabs. 
The main Arab terrorist organization in 1960s was the PLO. The PLO 
established and made operations to Israel from Jordan. However, the PLO had 
problems with King Hussein thus it was ousted from Jordan. Afterwards, it was 
established in Lebanon, and Syria had opportunity to controll the PLO. Indeed Syria 
had little influence over the PLO before 1967, however after the 1967 Six Day War 
the PLO and other terrorist organizations became solid tools of Syrian state policy. 
Also the defeat of 1973 Yom Kippur War accelerated Assad’s policy to improve its 
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relations with Marxist Palestinian groups. The reasons were because of Syrian failure 
on political and military fields and these failures prevented Damascus from facing 
other rival states through diplomatic ways. Therefore Syria used terrorism as an 
instrument in its foreign policy; it used terrorism as a bargaining power against its 
rivals.223  
While the Arabs and Syria began to be interested in terrorist organizations, 
the USSR did not recognize them as legal organizations in the beginning of the 
1960s. As a result, the USSR did not establish relations with these groups until the 
end of the 1960s. However, with growing interest of the Soviets towards the Middle 
East and improving its relations with the Arab states, Moscow changed its mind 
about terrorist organizations, even considered some of them as liberation 
organizations and ‘freedom fighters’. Moreover the Soviets supported some of anti-
western terrorist organizations in order to abolish the pro-western regimes and 
establish new regimes that supported Soviet interests. On the other hand, the West 
also supported terrorist organizations in order to influence Syrian and other Arab 
policies.224   
Syria supported Marxist movements in Lebanon especially after the Syrian 
intervention to Lebanon. Syrian aim in supporting terrorist activities in Lebanon was 
because of the intention to use them against Israel and other rival states as well as 
Turkey and to maintain control over Lebanon. The Soviet Union also supported the 
Marxist movement in Lebanon as well as all over the world and tried to create a ‘safe 
heaven’ for Marxist organizations. From the early 1970s, left-wing Turkish terrorists 
also began to use Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control in order to train their 
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militants.225 Some of the terrorist organizations that were established in Bekaa Valley 
under control of Syria were Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA), People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP/C or known as 
Acilciler), Revolutionary Left, Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army 
(TIKKO), Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Force (MLSPB), Turkish Communist 
Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/M-L), Revolutionary Communist Party/Armed Popular 
Corporations (DKP/SHB). 
Turkey changed its policy on the Palestinian issue after the 1970s because 
Ankara saw some political benefits of rapprochement with the Arab world after the 
1967 Arab-Israel War.226 Thus Turkey recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people in all liberated Palestinian territory,” since 
October 1974.227 From then on, Turkey officially referred to “Palestine” instead of 
“the Palestinian Authority” or “the PLO,” and “President Arafat” instead of “the 
chairman Arafat.” 228 
Turkey worried about support to the anti-regime terrorist organizations 
against itself emanating from Lebanon. Although there was some information about 
PLO support to the anti-Turkish regime terrorists that the PLO denied, Turkey kept 
its silent position on the issue. Indeed terrorist activities in Bekaa Valley could not be 
realized without Syrian authority or PLO’s knowledge that controlled the valley and 
                                                 
225 Nihat Ali Özcan. 1999. PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi.(PKK (Kurdish 
Workers’ Party): It’s History, Ideology and Method). Ankara:ASAM.pp.12-13. 
226 When the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios proposed a decision against Turkey in the Third Non-
Aligned Summit Conference in Zambia in 1970 like the one in 1964, some of the moderate Arab 
states such as Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait and also the radical Arab states like the United Arab 
Emirates, Algiers, and Syria supported Turkey against the proposal. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. 1972. opcit. 
pp.10-12. 
227 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. 1987. “Development of Turkish-Arab Relations: A Historical Appraisal.” In 
Seyfi Taşhan and Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu (eds.) Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara: 
Foreign Policy Institute. pp. 8-27. 
228 Alan Makovsky. 1996. “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish “Periphery Strategy”?” In Henri J. 
Barkey ed., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East. Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press. pp.147-170. 
 87 
terrorist organizations that were trained in the valley. Even then Turkey permitted the 
PLO to open an office in Ankara. This was because of the new Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Arabs that was applied from the beginning of the 1960s in which 
Turkey obtained some benefits especially in the international arena of rapprochement 
with the Arabs since 1960. Indeed Arab states along with the USSR sometimes 
supported Turkey’s interests in the international arena. 
 
5.5. Transboundary Water Problems Revisited 
From the mid 1950s, Turkey and Syria did not confront each other seriously 
considering water issues. It seemed that water issues were left to time. Especially at 
the beginning of the 1960s and Turkish rapprochement with the Arab world, it was 
thought that Turkey was compromised to Syria and Arab world. This thought might 
have stemmed from worsening of Turkey’s situation in the international arena 
because of problems with its ally, the USA, on the Cyprus issue and threatening to be 
left alone against a possible Soviet threat by the USA. Although its allies did not 
support Turkey, Ankara tried to continue its development every way possible. One of 
the main development regions was the southeast region of Turkey.  
Turkey, in order to continue its economic growth and develop its southeastern 
region, planned to build a dam over Euphrates, the Keban Dam. Syria and Turkey 
arranged a meeting of sharing the water resources in September 1964.  However 
Turkey stopped the meeting because Syria wanted to consider water resources only 
on the basis of the Euphrates River without discussing the water regime of Asi River. 
Iraq proposed to arrange a meeting of water resources between Syria, Turkey and 
Iraq in 1965. 
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Not only Syria but also Iraq hesitated about Turkey’s decision to build a dam 
over Euphrates because both states thought that Turkey would cut their water 
resources and leave them into a difficult situation if Ankara built an irrigation dam 
over Euphrates. Thus both states lobbied against building the dam in international 
organizations that were to assist Turkey. Turkey decided unilaterally to allow 350 
cubic meter per second water flow to Syria not to endanger the funding sources that 
was needed in construction of the Keban Dam.229 As a result they were partly 
successful in their attempts to build a dam but the international organizations 
provided Turkey funds to build a hydroelectric plant over Euphrates, not an irrigation 
dam.230  
Although Turkey faced problems and obstacles in international organizations 
and even when its allies did not support Turkey’s interests, the West and the USA 
restricted Turkey in its economic projects, Turkey continued to plan and tried to 
build new irrigation and development projects. One of them was the Southeast 
Anatolian Development Project (GAP), which was planned as of 1964. As mentioned 
above, with Syrian and Iraqi initiatives, the West and USA did not fund Turkey in 
this huge project. Speculation had it that this was because of the US plan to gain 
concessions in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the Israeli side over Turkey’s back.231 
Nonetheless Turkey planned its development project of GAP despite the lack 
support from its allies and international organizations. However, Turkey could not 
afford to realize this ‘gigantic’ project till the end of the 1970s. Syrian initiative of 
building Tabqa or al-Thawra Dam on Euphrates and beginning to fill Lake Assad in 
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1976 accelerated Turkish efforts to build a dam over Euphrates for irrigation and 
hydroelectricity.232  
Turkey’s intention of using water inside its borders was considered by Syria 
as a dangerous development. Thus, in order to get rid of the dangerous situation, 
Syria put pressure on Turkey by using international organizations, e.g. the Arab 
League and World Bank that Syria applied before 1970 in order to obstruct Turkish 
efforts on building Keban Dam for irrigation purposes. Indeed Syrian efforts were 
sometimes effective when its allies in the international arena did not support Turkey. 
For instance, halting to sell petroleum by some of the petroleum producing states to 
Turkey in 1977 was perceived as a reaction to reduce the flow of Euphrates by 
Turkey. Ankara had to guarantee the World Bank to release 500 cubic meters per 
second of water to Syria in order not to face financing problems for the Karakaya 
Dam, which would be the biggest dam of Turkey when planned, over the Eupharates 
River at Malatya.233 
 
Turkey was badly affected from Menderes’s foreign policy during the 1950s. 
Although their aim was to protect Turkey from external threats, the foreign policy 
took Turkey out of the Middle East. Syria and other Arab states saw Turkey as an 
‘instrument of imperialism’ in the Middle East. 
However, with the beginning of the 1960s, Turkey changed its stance towards 
the Arab world. Now Ankara adopted the principles that Taşhan summarized: non-
interference in domestic affairs of the Arab states; non-interference in intra-Arab 
relations; equality among states of the region and development of bilateral relations; 
political support to the Arab states for Palestine and maintaining diplomatic ties with 
                                                 
232 Philip Robins. 1991. Turkey and the Middle East. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Chantam House Papers). p.89. 
233 Yakup Şalvarcı. 2003. opcit. p.300. 
 90 
Israel; not allowing Turkey’s Western relations adversely affect its relations in the 
Middle East and vice versa.234 
Although Turkey obtained some benefits from applying these principles, 
Ankara sometimes had problems with Syria, e.g. Syrian support to terrorist groups 
and on the water issue. Turkey’s political conjuncture, domestically as well in 
foreign affairs, was to change dramatically after 1980.  
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CHAPTER VI: 
ADOPTING YET ANOTHER ACTIVE POLICY (1980-1991) 
 
6.1. The Turgut Özal Period  
Turkey had severe internal problems at the beginning of the 1980s. In this 
difficult situation, the coup d’état led by General Kenan Evren took over on 
September 12, 1980. This was the second direct interference of the armed forces in 
Turkey’s political life. Although pressure from other states and international 
organizations was expected because of the coup d’etat, the West especially the USA 
assented to the coup with tolerance. The NATO and the Council of Europe also 
reacted to the coup with tolerance. One reason towards the coup was because of 
Turkey’s intention to continue the January 24 economic decisions.235 
Bülent Ulusu, who was appointed as the Prime Minister by the coup makers, 
declared in the program of government that Turkey continued its peaceful foreign 
policy with intentions to last its good relationships with NATO, Europe and the 
USA. He emphasized that Turkey intended to improve its relations with its neighbors 
and gave special importance to the relationship between the USSR and Turkey. 
Turkey continued to support the Middle East problems and crisis due to principals of 
justice and equity and rejection of occupation of territories. Ankara also supported 
rights of the Palestinians.236 Turkey did not accept, as its Arab neighbors did, the 
Israeli decision of claiming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel with its undividable 
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territorial integrity in July 1980. While the Arab states decided to break off relations 
with Israel, Turkey downgraded its ambassadorial level to the secondary secretary 
level and rejected Israeli’s request to open an embassy in Jerusalem.237 Turkey’s 
supportive policy continued was clearly seen in Turkey’s attitude towards the 
annexation of Golan Heights by Israel. Turkey protested the decision of the 
annexation and declared that it did not recognize the Israeli decision.238 These 
policies pleased the Syrian side as well as the other Arab states. 
Another indication of Turkish supportive policy towards the Arabs in 1982 
was during the US intervention to Lebanon. Turkey was cautious of taking sides with 
the US about intervention in Lebanon and permitting the US to use İncirlik Base by 
following its rapprochement policy with the Arabs. However the US was given 
permission to use the base in December 1983 only for humanitarian purposes. 
Turkey gave the permission after discussions with Saudi Arabia in order not to cause 
Arab resentment. Indeed the permission came after the declaration of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus in November 15, 1983 and during the co-production 
negotiations of F-16 fighter airplanes were continuing in order to show the US that 
Turkey was still a sincere ally of the US.239 
Following three years of regime of the coup d’état, Turkey went to an 
election in which Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister. From then on, Turkey 
adopted an ‘active’ foreign policy, which was provided by lessened tensions in 
international affairs.  
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Indeed, although the multi-faceted policy that Turkey adopted in the 1960s 
was because of political factors, Ankara applied a multi-faceted policy by taking into 
account economic factors in the 1980s. The economic approach in multi-faceted 
policy generally began in the 1970s but it was evident especially as of the 1980s.240 
Prime Minister Özal saw that Turkey had to improve economic and trade relations 
with the Arab world for providing development. Thus Turkey began an ‘active 
export strategy’ especially towards the Middle Eastern countries. This strategy gave 
its fruits from the very beginning that “Turkish exports to the Middle East increased 
fivefold” between 1980 and 1985.241 
Despite an increase in Turkish exports towards the Middle East, Turkey could 
not continue the improvement. Turkish trade towards the Middle East declined in the 
1985-1995 period.242 On the contrary, while the volume of trade with the Middle 
East was decreasing, relations with the USA improved rapidly. “Turgut Özal's 
unabashed pro-Americanism, and a vigorously restored foreign assistance program - 
1985 and 1986 were high water marks in US aid to Turkey, nearly a billion dollars' 
worth annually - sustained bilateral ties.”243 
Moreover, while Turkey improved its relations with the US, the relations with 
Israel were also improving from the mid-1980s, even though Turkey had 
downgraded its diplomatic representation level. This rapprochement was because of:  
The lack of Arab support concerning the Cyprus issue, their lack of 
attention to the mistreatment of Bulgarian Turks, tensions over water 
rights, and differences over ASALA and PKK activities, put an end 
to high levels of economic and political relations between Turkey 
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and some Arab countries. The main thrust of Bolukbasi's argument 
suggests that Turkish decision-makers replaced solidarity with Arabs 
with solidarity with Israel, gradually coming to see the Tel Aviv 
administration as its main partner in Middle East politics.244 
In addition to these suggestions, Syria had not only differences with Turkey 
over issues of terrorism but was also an active supporter of terrorist organizations 
against Turkey and its other rivals.  
With the growing importance for the US in the Middle East as in 1950s, 
Turkey became a regional power in the Middle East. On the other side, Syria 
weakened after non-lasting conflicts and wars against Israel and continuing disputes 
with its neighbors, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. However, in the 1980s, Turkey’s army 
was the second biggest army of NATO. Turkish Armed Forces was superior to Syria 
not only in manpower but also in technological means.  
 
6.2. PKK Terrorism 
Syrian policy of supporting terrorist organizations continued after 1980. 
Although Syria denied its relations with terrorist organizations, the US put Syria on 
the list of supporter states of terrorism by the late 1970s. Indeed Syria was mostly 
accepted as supporter of terrorist organizations from the mid-1960s. It is interesting 
enough that Syria supported terrorist organizations cooperating with the Soviet 
Union. However the Soviet Union did not appear mostly as a terror supporter state 
although some countries argued that it was.  
From the 1970s, Syria had a state policy of supporting terrorist organizations 
in order to have an advantageous situation in bargaining tables considering its ‘rival’ 
                                                 
244 Bülent Aras. 2002. “The Academic Perceptions of Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Alternatives, 1(1): 
10-22. Aras attributed these suggestions to the article of Suha Bolukbasi. 1999. "Behind The Turkish- 
Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View," Journal of Palestinian Studies, 29(1): 28-29. 
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states. For Turkey, Syria supported extremist leftist groups in Bekaa Valley; Syria 
even supported ASALA against Turkey from the late 1970s. Syrian aim of 
supporting terrorist groups, as mentioned above, was because of Syrian will of 
wearing its rivals out, which it could not eliminate by war through diplomatic means.  
When Syria realized that it could not obstruct Turkey by diplomatic means, 
Syria strengthened its efforts to obstruct Turkey by non-diplomatic ways. From the 
beginning of the 1980s, Syria changed its terror tool to Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan). It is interesting enough that the activities of 
ASALA finished when PKK activities intensified. Syria began to support PKK as a 
bargaining card during the diplomatic discussions with Turkey especially in the 
water conflict.245  
Although PKK was founded before 1980, PKK did not have influence during 
its first years inside Turkey, especially after the September 12 coup d’état. Thus 
Abdullah Öcalan began to live in Damascus and lead the PKK from Damascus. PKK 
was established in Bekaa Valley that was under control of Palestinian guerrillas and 
had help in training its terrorists.246 Keeping Öcalan in Syria and PKK militants in 
the Bekaa Valley was the first indication of Syrian support. However the support was 
not the last help that Syria provided to PKK. Syria also helped PKK in training the 
militants with its secret service during the 1980s; Syria permitted PKK to get 
established and open bureaus in Syria. Nonetheless, when “Turkey insists on Syria’s 
ceasing to support anti-Turkish activity and toughens its stance, Syria asks Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and PKK guerrillas to leave 
the country.”247 
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Although Syria asked that PKK members leave the country, the support of 
Syria still continued. Even Öcalan said, “The Iranian President Ali Ekber Hashimi 
Rafsancani and Syrian President Hafiz Assad are two friends of mine. My 
organization has friendly relations with Iran and Syria.”248 This was a proof of Syrian 
support to PKK. 
Turkey saw Syrian intention of using PKK as a ‘foreign policy tool’ in 
relations between Turkey and Syria especially through the water conflict. Looking 
into the issue from Turkish side, Ankara wanted to solve the problem without 
straining relations. Furthermore Turkey agreed to sign two protocols with Syria in 
Damascus. While Turkey guaranteed to flow 500 cubic meters per second of water 
from the Euphrates River according to the first protocol, with the second protocol 
“Syria pledges to end its support of PKK and other anti-Turkish groups.”249 
Nevertheless Syria continued to support PKK in the following years. In 
October 1989, Turkey publicized that it ended its support to the 1987 document, 
because Syria did not adhere to the security accord of the 1987 protocol. Turgut Özal 
accused Syria of not taking any measures on the Turkish-Syrian border where PKK 
infiltrations still continued.250 Turkey had more anxiety in the following years that it 
accused Syria of waging an ‘undeclared war’ against Turkey and threatened 
Damascus with military consequences unless the war continued.251  
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6.3. GAP and Water Issue 
From the beginning of the 1980s Turkey began the ‘gigantic’ Southeast 
Anatolian Development Project (GAP). The GAP project planned to realize “agro-
industrial development” in southeastern part of Turkey.252 Its main principles were 
“to boost the agricultural production of the region, to develop water and energy 
resources, and to increase regional employment and infrastructure.”253 The project 
contains 22 dams and 19 hydro-electric plants on the Euphrates and Tigris254 and first 
stage of the project will cost $12 billion.255 
Syria and Iraq feared this ‘gigantic’ development project because they 
believed that it caused water shortages and hampered their irrigation and 
hydroelectricity projects. Thus Syria, Iraq and Turkey arranged a trilateral technical 
committee in 1980. The technical committee met fourteen times until 1989 but did 
not reach an agreement by either state.256 The disagreement was because of different 
opinion of the sides. While Syria claimed Euphrates River to be ‘international 
waters,’ Turkey claimed Euphrates as ‘transboundary waters.’ Also while Syria 
demanded from Turkey ‘sharing of water’ from its source, which means ‘common 
sovereignty,’ Turkey claimed ‘allocation’ in the water dispute. Turkey also 
emphasized that it depended on the principle of ‘equality’ in allocation of water.257 
Indeed Turkey committed to Syria to allow more than 500 m³/sec. of water by 
signing of the Protocol of Economic and Technical Cooperation in 1987.258 However 
Syrian attitude was not same as Turkish goodwill policy considering Asi River, 
which Syria did not allow water flow in the summer months. 
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Syria with its Arab friends had experience of using petroleum as a political 
weapon and was aware of the importance of water and feared that water resources 
would also be used in this way. Because of Syrian suspicions of Turkey “in 
possession of a powerful water weapon,”259 it tried to reach an agreement of 
controlling water from its source that tied Turkey’s hand.260  
In a distrustful environment, the so-called ‘Peace Pipeline Project,’ which 
appeared in 1986, cannot attract the Arab states interest including Syria. The project 
was based on “building two pipelines to supply drinking water from the Turkish 
rivers Ceyhan and Seyhan to the Arab peninsula, Syria and Jordan.”261 However the 
‘commercially minded idea’ did not get affirmative response from Syria and other 
Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia.262 The negative response was based on mainly 
two reasons: The distrustful environment of the Middle East was the first reason 
because the Middle Eastern states thought that the main reason of the pipeline was to 
provide water to Israel, the ancient enemy. The second reason was that Turkey would 
be able to influence the Middle Eastern affairs after establishing the pipeline263 and 
deepening Arab concerns of increased dependence upon Turkey.264  
  
Turkish rapprochement with the Arab world still continued after 1980. 
However Turkey was disturbed by Syrian support of terrorist groups and growing 
water disputes. Bilateral attempts did not succeed in solving the problems. 
Turkey improved its relations with the US after the 1980. Following the 1983 
elections and establishing Turgut Özal’s government, Turkey applied a more active 
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policy than the last two decades. He made daring attempts in diplomatic arena 
against Syria in order to have the initiative in terror and water disputes. The 
courageous attempts were because of growing US support to Turkey and declining 
Soviet support to Syria that left Syria alone in international arena. Syria was also 
isolated from the Arab world because of its policies in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER VII: 
CONCLUSION 
 
After the end of World War II, the world was in a great change of 
international relations as if the world was left to the hands of the superpowers, the 
USSR and USA. In this changing environment, mainly Britain and France left the 
Middle East to the superpowers. Because of the World War II, France became weak 
than before the war. This caused France diminished its influence in its mandate 
states, such as Syria. As a result, Syria gained its independence in 1946 with support 
of the superpowers. From then on, Turkey established relations with Syria. Turkish 
foreign policy towards Syria was not different from Turkish foreign policy towards 
Arabs. When Turkish relations with Arabs strained, it generally strained with Syria, 
or vice versa. 
Turkey followed a foreign policy of advancing through the contemporary 
world since it was founded. Thus the Middle East took negligible part in Turkish 
foreign policy. Indeed Turkey signed the Saadabat Pact (Non-aggression Pact) with 
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937. However the pact was far from an example of 
activist policy but rather a defensive one because with this pact either side accepted 
not to involved domestic issues of the other. Turkey wanted to secure its southern 
borders and its territorial integrity by signing the pact. After being silent for the last 
twenty years in the Middle East, Turkey began to get involved into Middle Eastern 
affairs. Actually, the involvement can be summarized as drawing of Turkey into the 
Middle East by the US and Britain at some aspects.  
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After the World War II, the Soviet Union demanded Turkey from territorial 
rights and joint defense of the Straits. However Turkey refused all of the Soviet 
demands. In the face of growing and continuing Soviet demands, Turkey, in order to 
provide its security and territorial integrity, wanted to join North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  
Although Turkey did not want to involve in Middle Eastern affairs, after the 
World War II, Turkey objected the partition plan in 1947 of Palestine along with 
other Arab states that pleased Arabs and Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli even 
sent an appreciation message to President İsmet İnönü for Turkey’s support. 
Contradictory to the objection of the partition plan in the UN, Turkey recognized 
newly founded Israel by 1949. Concerns about military and diplomatic aid that was 
provided by the US and being not accepted to every type of western organizations 
made Turkey be along with other western powers on recognizing Israel. Turkey did 
not take into account Arab reactions because of the West was more important in 
Turkish foreign policy. 
With the beginning of the 1950, Turkey had drawn into the Middle East. 
Actually, because of security concerns and desires of being align with the West, there 
seemed no danger of Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East. However, after the 
changing of the Soviet leadership that Khrushchev adopted new way in Soviet 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, Turkey would face with difficult problems 
especially after 1955. In 1955, Khrushchev decided to enter in Middle Eastern 
affairs, and the Baghdad Pact could be spoil Moscow’s plans. Thus the Soviet Union 
reacted negatively to the pact and its attitude was clearly seen in the first crisis 
between Syria and Turkey of 1957 crisis. The Soviet Union gave reaction to Turkish 
amassing troops on the Syrian-Turkish border and benefited from supporting Syria 
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by using Turkey. The Soviet Union even threatened Turkey with war if Turkish 
stance towards Syria continued. Turkey also attracted Arab resentment after 
permitting US to use bases in 1958 Lebanon crisis. From then on, the Soviet Union 
strengthened its position in the Middle East of course in Syria. On the contrary, 
Turkey was isolated from the Middle East and Arab world because of taking side 
with the West. 
Turkey did not gain more of aligning with the West in the Middle East but 
rather became mired in the swamp in the beginning of the 1960s. Moreover, Turkey 
saw disadvantages of being isolated from Arabs especially in the international arena. 
Turkey waited Arabs support in the Cyprus crisis in 1964 but Arabs did not support 
Turkish interests in the crisis including Syria. In addition to displeasure of not 
supporting in the crisis, the US sent a warning letter to Turkey that Turkey would not 
be defended in a possible war. Turkey disappointed by the letter and adopted a new 
in its foreign policy of rapprochement with Arabs and also establishing good 
relations with the Soviet Union.  
From 1965, Turkey quitted from its 1950 foreign policy and applied new 
principles in its foreign policy: non-interference in domestic affairs of the Arab 
states; non-interference in intra-Arab relations; equality among states of the region 
and development of bilateral relations; political support to the Arab states for 
Palestine and maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel; not allowing Turkey’s Western 
relations adversely affect its relations in the Middle East and vice versa.265 The 
policy can be called as multi-faceted foreign policy that was different from the 
western-oriented foreign policy. Actually Turkey signed economic treaty with the 
Soviet Union to build factories that estimated nearly $ 200 million. 
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 103 
During the 1970s, Turkey was almost far from aligning with the US in 
Middle Eastern affairs. Following Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the arm embargo 
caused Turkey continue its multi-faceted policy.  Although Turkey mostly supported 
Syrian interests in its conflicts or rather preferred to be neutral in inter-Arab 
relations, Syria was not sensitive to Turkish national interests. Syria took no notice of 
terrorist organizations, which had training facilities in the Bekaa Valley under Syrian 
protectorate, against the Turkish regime. Syria did not accede to Turkish request on 
water disputes; moreover, it made lobbies against Turkish initiatives of building 
dams over Euphrates. 
Turkish multi-faceted policy still continued after the 1980 coup d’état. 
Because of having Arab resentment after aligning with the US in Lebanon Crisis by 
1958, Turkey was careful in the 1982 Lebanon Crisis. Turkey permitted to use the 
bases for only humanitarian purposes after discussing with Saudi Arabia. Although 
Syria was listed in the terrorist supporter state, Syria, as in the 1970s, used PKK as 
tool against Turkey. However, Turkey, under Turgut Özal, seemed to leave its low-
profile policy. Having hopes of cutting Syrian support to PKK, Turkey signed a 
security and water protocols with Syria. Although Turkey had some impressions of 
leaving the low-profile policy towards the Arab world, it did not leave diplomacy 
aside in its relations with Syria.  
Consequently, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in private and Arabs in 
general was not only drawn with Soviet threat, but Turkey’s aim of using its allies’ 
defense capabilities and Turkish national interests. While Turkish moves in the 
1950s did not serve benefits to Turkish national interests, multi-faceted policy that 
began from 1965 served more to national interests.  
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We can see the evolution of Turkish attitude towards the Arab world and the 
Soviet Union from the UN Resolutions and Turkish position in the resolutions. In 
considering the 1947 and 1965 period, Turkey voted as same as the US in the UN on 
Middle Eastern problems. In this period Turkey mostly voted on parallel with the US 
while it voted % 36 of the resolutions same as the Soviet Union and Egypt. However, 
in the 1965-1975 tenure, the situation became reversed. We understand from the 
votes that Turkey did not follow the policy on parallel with the US but voted % 92 
same in the Soviet Union and Egypt. This multi-faceted policy continued in the 
1975-1991 period Turkey mostly voted with the Soviet Union and Egypt.266 
Thus Syrian-Turkish relations were not affected directly by the Soviet Union 
in both negative and positive way. Since Syria was not a ‘satellite’ state of the Soviet 
Union, it did not apply its foreign relations on parallel with Moscow. Syria even 
created problems to Moscow and had intentions to use the Soviet Union as its 
supporter. On the other side, Turkey did not apply its foreign relations because of 
Soviet threat. While Turkey adopted a multi-faceted foreign policy, it did not 
undervalue either side that includes the Soviet Union and the West and the Arab 
world. 
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